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LAWS OF NATURE AND THE BUSINESS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY
Philip McGarriglet & Vern Norvieltt
Abstract
The Supreme Court has shown an interest in the Intellectual
Property area recently, particularly with respect to patentability
under 35 U.S.C. §101. An appeal entitled LabCorp v. Metabolite
raised the product of nature exception to patentability, but this issue
was not decided by the full court. To understand what may happen in
a similar appeal, the present article reviews what occurred in the
LabCorp case, the relevant Supreme Court decisions that preceded it,
and relevant case law that has arisen afterwards. This article also
discusses the potential effect on biological and diagnostic claims that
are already issued or pending.
t Adjunct Professor at Santa Clara University. Vice President and Chief Intellectual
Property Counsel at Affymetrix, Inc.
tt Adjunct professor at Santa Clara University. Partner at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of patent systems, two basic criteria for the
grant of patents have stood out. The first criteria is that an idea or an
invention must be "new," "novel," "not obvious," have an "inventive
step," or meet some other basic criteria for newness. The idea or
invention must also have some "utility" or be useful in some manner.
In addition, the idea or invention must fall within a basic category of
inventions for which patent protection is available. Put differently,
regardless of how excitingly "new" or how generally useful an idea or
an invention may be, there are some ideas and inventions that society
has determined simply are not patentable and which are therefore
referred to as "off limits." An example of "off-limit" ideas in the
United States is the discovery of new compounds that are found in
nature.' The "off-limits" ideas were often basic principles, products,
or observations found in nature and it was felt that patents should not
be awarded for simply discovering them. These new ideas were
determined by society to be off limits because, among other reasons,
it was believed that you can get too much of a good thing. That is,
while patents often help aid inventors to develop inventions and
advance the art, there are some ideas that, in balance, would not be of
benefit to society if covered by patents. The "off limit" invention
category most recently addressed by the Supreme Court and of clear
relevance to the biotechnology industry is the "law of nature"
category.2
The purpose of this article is to review and discuss the law that
will affect biological and diagnostic claims in this off limits area
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 101. It is structured in several sections as
1. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132-33 (1854).
2. There is an entry level question that is not explored in this article, and normally not
addressed by courts to date. Specifically, the question is "what is a law of nature"? This
question is highly relevant, virtually imponderable at some level, and worthy of investigation on
its own account. Entire books are written about the question and there are differing views. For
example, on one end of the extreme is Albert Einstein, who points out that even the "laws of
nature," such as the constancy of the speed of light, which may be frequently cited as models of
a "law of nature," are actually not laws at some level. "[N]atural laws [referring to Newton's
"laws"] claim validity only when an inertial system is taken as the basis of the space-time
description. The principle of inertia and the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light
are valid only with respect to an inertial system [which would be modified by the theories of
relativity]." ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND THE GENERAL THEORY, 170-71
(Robert W. Lawson trans., Three Rivers Press 1961). Others take a less rigid view of a "law of
nature." For example, it is open to question whether any of the claims at issue for the patents
discussed herein are "laws of nature," or correlations that provide only general direction to a
scientist or physician. This issue should be explored in any case as an entry point.
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follows. The first section sets out the historical development for
statutory subject matter using the early English case law and
legislation and then discusses the decisional development in the
United States until the early 1980s. The next section discusses a 2006
Supreme Court case that illustrates a biological and diagnostic
context. Recent case law published thereafter is discussed in the
following section then concludes with tests for statutory subject
matter and how they may affect current claims.
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides the statutory basis for questions such
as what constitutes a law of nature. This section provides: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."
3
II. ROOTS OF THE LAW OF NATURE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
A. The Early Legal Principle
The early English system of patent law assumed that everything
was an off-limit area of technology unless it was a "new
manufacture. 'A In effect, a large amount of technology was in the off-
limit area, including manufacturing techniques, and methods of
operation.
5
1. English Patent Cases
Early patent cases began to address the limits of patentable
subject matter. For example, Neilson v. Harford,6 in the English Court
of the Exchequer, addressed the patentability of an improved
application of heated air to produce heat in fires, forges and furnaces.
The invention related to the idea that a forge or furnace operated
better if the incoming air was pre-heated. The Court held:
It is very difficult to distinguish [the invention] from the
specification of a patent for a principle, and this at first created in
the minds of the Court much difficulty; but after full consideration,
3. 35 U.S.C. §101 (2000).
4. English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3, § 6.
5. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836) (repealed 1870).
6. Neilson v. Harford, (1841) 151 Eng. Rep. 1266.
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we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle, but a
machine embodying a principle, and a very valuable one.
The Court decided that the patent was not for a principle, but for
a mode of carrying out the principle. 8 In effect, the Court struggled
with the same issue with which courts struggle today - is a patent
claiming the law of nature, i.e. the principle, or is the patent covering
an invention in which the principle is applied to something new and
patentable?
The Court decided that, while the principle that hot air will
promote ignition of fuel better than cold air was embodied in the
machine, the principle alone was not sufficient to support the patent.
Instead it was supported because Neilson had applied the principle to
invent a mechanical apparatus which could deliver a current of hot air
instead of cold.9
2. Early Supreme Court Cases - A Prior Art Approach
An early case in the United States dealt with the patentable
subject matter question in the context of a method claim. In Le Roy v.
Tatham,10 the Tatham brothers sued Thomas Le Roy and David
Smith. for infringement of a patent for an improvement on the
machinery of making lead pipes. The Court stated:
A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original
cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist
to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those
already known."
... [T]he invention is not in discovering them, but in applying
them to useful objects.' z
... But the jury were instructed, 'that the originality of the
invention did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in
bringing a newly discovered principle into practical application.' 13
7. Id. at 1273
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852).
11. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
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The Court said that the proper way to consider the patent claims
was the novelty of the combination of the parts and not whether a
newly developed property of lead might have been patented.
However, the Court's previous statements, excerpted above, indicate
that a newly developed property of lead would not have been
patentable. 14
3. 0 'Reilly v. Morse - A Written Description Approach
Samuel F.B. Morse sued Whitman and Hastings for infringing
two of his patents on the telegraph (the 1840 and 1848 patents).' 5 The
Court found claim 8 of the 1840 patent was invalid and that the
remaining claims were valid and infringed. Claim 8 read as follows:
"[t]he combination and arrangement of electro-magnets, in one or
more circuits of metallic conductors, with armatures of magnets, for
transmitting intelligence by signs and sounds, or either, between
distant points and to different points simultaneously.'
' 6
Neilson was cited for the premise that "the discovery of a
principle in a natural philosophy or physical science, is not
patentable."' 7 The Court determined that Morse had "not discovered,
that the electric or galvanic current will always print at a distance"
and that electro-magnetism may be used as a motive power without
printing at a distance.'
8
The Court held that claim 8 was overly broad and could "derive
no aid from the specification filed." 9 It was drawn to any use of
electro-magnetism "for making or printing intelligible characters,
letters, or signs, at any distances" 20 and the patent was not limited "to
the specific machinery, or parts of machinery described in the
foregoing specifications and claims.'
The Court used terminology similar to a contemporary written
description rejection, i.e., failure of the specification to describe what
was covered by the language of claim 8. The Court stated "[flor he
[Morse] claims what he has not described in the manner required by
law. And a patent for such a claim is strongly forbidden by the act of
13. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added).
14. Id
15. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
16. Id. at 78.
17. Id. at 116.
18. Id. at 117.
19. Id. at 119.
20. Id. at 86.
21. Id.
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Congress. 22 Outside of the written description issues, Morse has been
cited for the premise that one cannot patent a mere principle,2 3
especially when a natural phenomenon is one of its few described
elements.
Tilghman v. Proctor24 follows up on the Morse decision. Richard
Tilghman sued William Proctor and James Gamble (Proctor and
Gamble) for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 11,766 (filed Oct. 3,
1854). Tilghman's patent claims a process of separating "fat acids and
glycerin from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature
and pressure., 25 The Court found the patent valid and infringed. The
single claim of the patent read as follows: "I claim, as of my
invention, the manufacturing of fat acids and glycerin from fatty
bodies by the action of water at a high temperature and pressure. 26
This case is cited for the concept that a patent can be granted for
a process, not just for machines and compositions of matter.
However, the Court distinguished Tilghman from Morse as follows:
Yet it has been supposed that the decision in O'Reilly v. Morse
was adverse to patents for mere processes. The mistake has
undoubtedly arisen from confounding a patent for a process with a
patent for a mere principle .... The eighth claim of Morse's patent
was held to be invalid, because it was regarded by the court asS • 27
being not for a process, but for a mere principle.
The Tilghman Court viewed Morse's claim 8 as being invalid since it
was a claim to the power of electro-magnetism itself, rather than a
process of utilizing the power; "a claim put forward on the ground
that the patentee was the first to discover that it could be thus
employed.,
28
The Tilghman Court then quoted extensively from the Morse
opinion in order to provide support for their interpretation of Morse.2 9
While it is clear that Morse does not stand for the proposition that
process claims are unpatentable, it is not clear that Morse stands for
the premise cited in Tilghman. Arguably, the sections of Morse cited
by the Tilghman court suggest that the real basis of the Morse opinion
22. Id. at 120.
23. See infra note 24.
24. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
25. Id. at 709.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 726.
28. Id. at 727.
29. Id. at 726-28.
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was a lack of adequate written description rather than a claim to a
mere principle.
4. An Early "Biotechnology Case" - Revisiting the Prior
Art Approach and the Written Description Approach
In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.30 the United
States Supreme Court used the law of nature doctrine for the first time
as an early underpinning for the biotechnology field. Kalo Inoculant
sued Funk Brothers for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532
(filed Aug. 24, 1938) which had claims to the product and process of
making a mixed culture of root nodule bacteria for inoculating
leguminous plants.31 Funk Brothers counterclaimed that the patent
was invalid. Only the patentability of the product claims was
reviewed by the Court.
3 2
The patent claims in Funk Brothers were directed to a plant
inoculant made of several bacterial strains. Specifically,
1. An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of
selected cultures of different species of bacteria of the genus
Rhizobium, one of said cultures being Rhizobium trifolii alpha,
said cultures being substantially unaffected by each other in
respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for
which they are specific.
33
Each of the strains was individually found in nature and
beneficial to a particular plant. The proprietor of the patent, however,
had combined them together so that a fanner could buy one inoculant
for any of several plants rather than a particular inoculant for a
particular plant.34 The bacteria assist the plants in fixing nitrogen.
Historically there were different groups of leguminous plants that
could only be successfully inoculated by different species of bacteria
specific for each group.35 Previous mixed cultures of bacteria failed to
work properly because the different species inhibited each other. Kalo
Inoculant ascertained that mutually non-inhibitory strains existed. By
certain methods of selection and testing they isolated them and
30. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
31. Id. at 130.
32. Id.
33. U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 col.13 11.22-29 (filed Aug. 24, 1938).
34. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-30.
35. Id.. at 128-29.
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developed a mixed culture that could be used equally well with
multiple groups of leguminous plants.36
The Seventh Circuit thought that the inventor did more than
discover a law of nature, since he had made a new and different
composition of non-inhibitive strains that had utility in the
manufacture of inoculants.37 However, the Supreme Court was not
persuaded, and held "[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of
the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men.",38 The Court went on to state
that the discovery was only in relation to the handiwork of nature and
that the combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change
in the species of bacteria and no enlargement of the range of utility.39
The Court held that "a product must be more than new and useful to
be patented; it must also satisfy the requirements of invention or
discovery. '40 The Court further stated that once the secret of the non-
inhibitive quality of certain strains of bacteria had been discovered it
was a simple step to produce a mixed inoculant that, while it may
"have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of
invention.' 4 1
In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter also concluded that the
claims were not patentable, but on written description or enablement
grounds rather than "work of nature" grounds.42 In his view, the
36. Id. at 129-30.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 130.
39. Id. at 131.
40. Id. at 131-32 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter also felt that rejections
based on law of nature were difficult to apply.
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as 'the work of
nature' and the 'laws of nature.' For these are vague and malleable terms infected
with too much ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may be
deemed 'the work of nature,' and any patentable composite exemplifies in its
properties 'the laws of nature.' Arguments drawn from such terms for
ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to challenge almost every
patent ..... Multi-purpose tools, multivalent vaccines, vitamin complex
composites, are examples of complexes whose sole new property is the
conjunction of the properties of their components. Surely the Court does not
mean unwittingly to pass on the patentability of such products by formulating
criteria by which future issues of patentability may be prejudged. In finding
Bond's patent invalid I have tried to avoid a formulation which, while it would in
fact justify Bond's patent, would lay the basis for denying patentability to a large
area within existing patent legislation.
Id. at 135 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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packaging of a mixture of particular strains of bacteria is a patentable
invention provided that the particular strains are identifiable and
adequately identified.4 3 He viewed the '532 patent as invalid since the
inventor
[A]ppears to claim that since he was the originator of the idea that
there might be mutually compatible strains and had practically
demonstrated that some strains exist, everyone else is forbidden to
use a combination of strains whether they are or are not identical
with the combinations that [the inventor] selected and packaged
together.
44
One possible implication of the majority's opinion is that
regardless of the time, effort and ingenuity involved in discovering
new attributes about living organisms, they are not patentable unless
they are changed from their natural state (as there is no physical
transformation). Further, aggregates of these bacteria are unpatentable
since they are also unchanged from nature.
This holding also raises a question of whether the converse holds
true: if aggregating things that exist in nature is not sufficient to
render them patentable, is isolating something from nature equally
insufficient? The patent office has placed a great deal of weight on the
word "isolated" in DNA, particularly in the context of protein
applications to differentiate claimed products from those found in
nature. However, based on Funk, it would be plausible to argue that
once the secrets of a DNA or protein sequence had been discovered, it
would be a "simple step" to isolate them. Consequently, this would
not be sufficient to qualify as a "product of invention".
B. Moving Beyond Novelty and Written Description
In Gottshalk v. Benson,45 a suit was brought by Gary Benson
against Robert Gottshalk, Acting Commissioner of Patents, over a
rejection of claims directed to a method for converting signals from
binary coded decimal form into pure binary numerals.46 The Court
framed the question as to whether the method described and claimed
was a "process" within the meaning of the 35 U.S.C. § 101. 4 7 It was
really a question of statutory subject matter.
43. Id. at 133 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 133 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
45. Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id.
2008]
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After reviewing the case law that analyzes patentability for
statutory subject matter, the Court simply held that an individual
cannot patent an idea:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles
or materials to a "different state or thing." We do not hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the
requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do
not so hold. It is said that we have before us a program for a digital
computer but extend our holding to programs for analog
computers. We have, however, made clear from the start that we
deal with a program only for digital computers. It is said we freeze
process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the
revelations of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not our
purpose. What we come down to in a nutshell is the following.
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical
effect that would be the result if the formula for converting BCD
numerals to pure binary numerals were patented in this case. The
mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital computer, which
means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent would
wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself. 48
The Court stated that Congress should address the issue of
patentability of computer programs and that the Patent Office was not
competent to search prior art for computer programs. 49 But the
language of the decision expressly left the door open to patent
technology that was not addressed by previous Supreme Court
decisions.
In a subsequent case, Parker v. Flook,50 a suit was brought by
Dale Flook against Lutrelle Parker, Acting Commissioner of Patents,
over a rejection of claims for calculating alarm limit values during
catalytic conversion processes, in which the only novel feature was
mathematical formula. 5' The issue confronting the Court was
"whether the identification of a limited category of useful, though
conventional, post-solution applications of such a [new mathematical]
48. Id. at 71-72.
49. Id.
50. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
51. Id. at 585.
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formula makes respondent's method eligible for patent protection."52
The Supreme Court assumed that the patent was novel and applied
section 101 to answer the question above.53 The plain language of
section 101 did not provide a straightforward answer since the Court
recognized that the "line between a patentable 'process' and an
unpatentable 'principle' is not always clear.,
54
The Court held that "a process is not unpatentable simply
because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm., 55
Following Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America56 and Funk Bros., the Court determined that "[t]he process
itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and
useful. 57
In Parker, the Court sets out an analysis that can be described as
follows: first, it must be determined if the algorithm or process recited
in the claim is a law of nature that cannot be patented because it is not
one of the kind of "'discoveries' that the statute was enacted to
protect"; second, if the answer is determined to be yes, then the claim
must be considered as if the algorithm is within the prior art;58 and
third, the claim must be examined to determine if there is some other
inventive concept recited. 59 The Court seemed willing to allow claims
that incorporate laws of nature if the claim is not otherwise limited to
conventional elements. In other words, the claim cannot stand alone
on a novel algorithm; some other element must be novel for the claim
to survive.
The Court found that the algorithm was not sufficient to make an
otherwise conventional method eligible for patent protection. 60 The
dissent took the position that the Court was importing novelty and
obviousness criteria into the section 101 analysis, which served
merely to muddy the issue since these are on there face separate
statutes with separate criteria. 61 However, Flook has not been
overturned and is still good law.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 588.
54. Id. at 589.
55. Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
56. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
57. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591.
58. Id. at 593-94.
59. Id. at 594.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Diamond v. Diehr62 was the last Supreme Court decision to
address statutory subject matter prior to Laboratory Corp. ofAmerica
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,63 and it continues to be one
of the most important decisions discussed thereafter. James Diehr
sued Sidney Diamond, Commissioner of Patents, based on a rejection
of his process claims. The Court of Claims and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) reversed. Certiorari was granted and Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The patent claimed a method of creating rubber products by
molding rubber using heat and pressure. 64 One of the steps in the
process also required monitoring the temperature and adjusting it
65
using a computer program. The patent office rejected the claim as
the computer program was nonstatutory subject matter and the
remainder of the claim was conventional.66 The Board of Appeals
agreed with the Examiner, but the CCPA reversed.6 7
The Supreme Court started its analysis by commenting on how it
intended to read the statute: "[In] in dealing with the patent laws, we
have more than once cautioned that 'courts 'should not read into the
patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.'" 68 These comments framed the scope of the analysis and
showed that the Court has a more expansive interpretation of statutory
subject matter.
62. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
63. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006). See
infra note 196.
64. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
The claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber
into cured precision products. The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the
uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in
the mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally operative
after the molding is completed.
65. Id. at 178-179.
Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside in the process of
constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. . . . [T]he
continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of
this information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time,
and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art.
66. Id. at 179-180.
67. Id. at 181. The CCPA noted that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory because a computer is involved. The respondents' claims were
not directed to a mathematical algorithm or an improved method of calculation but rather recited
an improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a practical problem that arose in the
molding of rubber products.
68. Id. at 182 (citations omitted).
2008] LAWS OF NATURE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 287
The Diehr Court considered the definition of a process and relied
on Cochrane v. Deener 69 and Gottshalk v. Benson70 to reemphasize
that "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state
or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
not include particular machines.",71 The Court then determined that
the process was directed to a step-by-step method for molding rubber,
72not a computer program. It was not rendered unpatentable due to the
presence of a computer program and a mathematical equation.73
The Court was also presented with the argument that the claim
was unpatentable because nothing else in the claim was new besides
the algorithm, which must be assumed to be prior art.74 However, the
Court stated that the claim must be analyzed as a whole:
In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process
for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered
as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and
new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements
in the analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because
a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even
though all the constituents of the combination were well known
and in common use before the combination was made.
75
The Court went on to explain that all inventions can be reduced to
their underlying principles that will make their implementation
obvious once they are known.
7 6
The next issue was whether the claim was trying to cover the
algorithm in the abstract. 77 The Court reiterated that the claim was a
process for curing rubber and not an attempt to protect the algorithm
itself.78 The focus was on the elements that were recognized as
patentable without the algorithm. The Court rejected the argument in
Flook that the claim should be patentable because all possible uses of
the algorithm were not preempted 79 At least one reason that the Flook
claims were not patentable was because insignificant post-solution
69. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
70. Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
71. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 192-93.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 189n.12.
75. Id. at 188.
76. ld. at 189 n.12.
77. Id. at 191.
78. Id. at 192-93.
79. Id. at 193 n.14.
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activity was not enough to make the claimed invention statutory
subject matter. 80 Consequently, the Court clarified Flook and
established a principle for determining what qualifies as statutory
subject matter when a computer program or other potential exclusion
to statutory subject matter was included in a claim.
C. Biotechnology Arrives
The classic first decision in biotechnology is Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.81 In that case, the Supreme Court determined that a live
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.82 The claimed micro-organism was a bacterium that had
been engineered with additional plasmids to aid in its ability to digest
oil.
The Supreme Court distinguished the facts of Chakrabarty from
Funk Bros. as follows: in Funk, the "patentee had discovered that
there existed in nature certain species of root-nodule bacteria which
did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other...
Concluding that the patentee had discovered 'only some of the
handiwork of nature,' the Court ruled the product nonpatentable.
83
Here, in contrast, the Court found that the patentee had "produced a
new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found
in nature... [h]is discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own;
accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101 .,84
The Court stated that the distinction for purposes of patentability
under section 101 is "not between living and inanimate things, but
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions., 85 Further, the Court clarified Flook and stated that it did
not "announce a new principle that inventions in areas not
contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are
unpatentable per se."86 The majority of the Court seemed to be
persuaded that Chakrabarty's bacterium was patentable since it was
new and different from natural bacteria.
80. Id.
81. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id. at 310.
84. Id.
85. Id. at313.
86. Id. at315.
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D. Application to Present Day Issues
The question of what qualifies as statutory subject matter
received attention in Supreme Court decisions up to 1981, but became
less important until the present day." Recent decisions have brought
this issue back to the attention of the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit and the Patent Office. These decision-making bodies have
often raised the issue sua sponte as a new rejection. 8
The question of what qualifies as statutory subject matter applies
irrespective of technology area, but has developed a focus in the
biotechnology arts, the computer program and signal areas. The
following text discusses the Supreme Court case that most recently
addresses what is statutory subject matter in the biotechnology and
diagnostic arena.
III, THE LABCoRP LITIGATION
In 2005, the Supreme Court was poised to address the question
of patentable subject matter for biological process claims when it
granted certiorari in Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Laboratory. Corp. of
America. Holdings.8 9 Ultimately, the case was left undecided, but
rapid advances in the rate of medical discovery and the importance of
patent protection for such discoveries make it likely that the issue of
what qualifies as statutory subject matter in a biological process claim
will be revisited. The following discussion starts with the facts and
events leading to the appeal to the Supreme Court because the issues
surrounding 35 U.S.C. § 101 were not discussed until the appeal
arrived at the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the lack of development
in the record was why the case was ultimately left undecided.
87. The Supreme Court discussed whether plants could be the subject of utility patents in
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 US 124 (2001). 35 USC §
101 was addressed, but not in the manner discussed in the previous cases above.
88. See Peter Zura, "Waiting for Nuijten" - 101 Rejections at the BPAI (Part I), Sept. 11,
2007, http://271patent.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-nuijten-101-rejections-at.html; Peter
Zura, "Waiting for Nuijten" - 101 Rejections at the BPAI (Part 2), Sept. 12, 2007,
http://271 patent.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-nuijten- 101-rejections-at_ 12.html. He
reports that appeals of section 101 rejections at the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
were at their lowest level in 2005 at 14 appeals, but that 2007 showed the highest level in recent
history.
89. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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A. The District Court
The patent in suit, U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (filed Nov. 20,
1986), is entitled "Assay for sulfhydryl amino acids and methods for
detecting and distinguishing cobalamin and folic acid deficiency". It
was assigned to University Patents Inc. (UPI), who licensed it to
Competitive Technologies Inc., and then to Metabolite.9" Metabolite
sublicensed the patent to Roche Biomedical Laboratories, which is
now known as LabCorp.
Claims 1-12 are directed to a particular method for assaying the
amount of one or more sulfhydryl amino acid species present in a
given sample, an example of which is homocysteine. 9 1 The patentees
also obtained claim 13, which covered a method for detecting a
deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-blooded animals:
13. A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in
warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of:
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine; and
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said
body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.
92
Cobalamin and folate are both B vitamins, commonly known as
B 12 and folic acid. A deficiency in these vitamins can cause vascular
disease, cognitive dysfunction, birth defects, and cancer, among other
conditions. 93 The test was designed to identify individuals with these
vitamin deficiencies, so that they could be treated with nutritional
supplements.94
LabCorp had originally performed assays according to the
method of claims 1-12, but changed to a new test obtained from
Abbott Laboratories. LabCorp then stopped paying royalties to
Metabolite, prompting the lawsuit. 95
Metabolite filed the lawsuit against LabCorp in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado for breach of contract and
90. Id. at 1359.
91. See U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 col. 41 (filed July 10, 1990).
92. '658 Patent col. 41.
93. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1358
94. Id.. The Court also commented that the inventors discovered the relationship between
elevated levels of total homocysteine and a deficiency in either cobalamin or folate and a test for
determining the level of homocysteine.
95. Id. at 1359.
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infringement of the '658 patent.96 At the end of the trial, the jury
found that LabCorp infringed the '658 patent because "[t]he record
shows that physicians order assays and correlate the results of those
assays. '97 The Colorado District Court assessed damages for breach
of contract and infringement (which were doubled for willfulness)
and also issued a permanent injunction.98
B. The Federal Circuit
On appeal, LabCorp raised several issues. They sought a new
construction of the term "correlating" in claim 13 and raised
invalidity defenses based on anticipation, obviousness, indefiniteness,
lack of written description and enablement.99 LabCorp also argued
that the claim only covered situations where the homocysteine levels
actually were elevated (approximately 20% of cases), not all tests.
However, LabCorp did not raise the issue of nonstatutory subject
matter as an invalidity defense.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's claim
construction of "correlating"'100 and rejected the arguments concerning
indefiniteness, lack of written description, lack of enablement,
anticipation and obviousness. 0 1 They also affirmed the holding of
infringement 10 2 as they found that physicians ordered the tests and
that LabCorp had encouraged or induced them to do so based on
LabCorp publications that republished the correlation between the
vitamin deficiency and the conditions. 10 3 The Court found that the
physicians were direct infringers and that LabCorp induced their
infringement. 104
96. Id. at 1359.
97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607) [hereinafter Solicitor General Brief
I]. For a discussion of split or joint infringement of patent claims, see BMC Res., Inc. v.
Paymentech, L.P., No. 2006-1503, 2007 WL 2728400 (Fed. Cir. (Tex.) Sept. 20, 2007);
PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Free Standing
Stuffer, Inc. v. Holly Dev Co., No. 72 C 1070, 1974 WL 20219 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 1974);
Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. La. 1980); Sriranga Veeraraghavan, Joint
Infringement of Patent Claims: Advice for Patentees, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 211 (2006).
98. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359.
99. Id. at 1361,1365-66; see also Solicitor General Brief 1, supra note 97, at 4.
100. Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1361 (correlating was interpreted to mean "mutual or
reciprocal relationship between" the elevated levels and the vitamin deficiencies).
101. Id. at 1366-68.
102. Id. at 1358.
103. Id. at 1365.
104. Id. at 1365.
292 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing and rehearing en banc on
August 5, 2004.105 Petitioner LabCorp then filed a request for
Certiorari on November 3, 2004 that was ultimately granted. 
06
C. Supreme Court
On February 28, 2005 the Supreme Court changed the focus of
the issues of the appeal and made the following request to the
Solicitor General of the United States:
The Acting Solicitor General is invited to file a brief in this case
expressing the views of the United States limited to the following
question: Respondent's patent claims a method for detecting a
form of vitamin B deficiency, which focuses upon a correlation in
the human body between elevated levels of certain amino acids and
deficient levels of vitamin B. The method consists of the
following: First, measure the level of the relevant amino acids
using any device, whether the device is, or is not, patented; second,
notice whether the amino acid level is elevated and, if so, conclude
that a vitamin B deficiency exists. Is the patent invalid because one
cannot patent "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas"? 
°7
In reply, the Solicitor General filed a brief on August 26, 2005,
focusing on two main issues: (1) whether the facts were sufficiently
developed in the lower courts to make a decision and, if so, (2) what
was the relevant law surrounding the substantive issue of utility and
the exceptions classified as "laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and
abstract ideas."' 1 8 The Supreme Court eventually decided to take the
case on October 31, 2005 and the Solicitor General filed a second
brief on December 23, 2005, with a discussion of additional issues.' 0 9
1. The Procedural Issue
The Solicitor General asserted that it was too late to raise the
question of utility at this stage of the appeal as the issue had not been
105. Id. at 1354.
106. See Petition for a Writ of Certiotari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006)
(No. 04-607) 2004 WL 2505526.
107. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185 (2005) (citation
omitted).
108. See Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 4, 5.
109. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607) [hereinafter Solicitor General Brief
11]. The two Solicitor General briefs overlap on the substantive issues.
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raised or developed in either the District Court or the Federal
Circuit." 0 Even though the issue was indirectly raised at the Federal
Circuit oral argument, it was discussed in support of a different
issue."' The lack of inter partes development affected the appeal
because the District Court did not have the opportunity to consider
various important factors in determining utility, such as the meaning
of the term "assay ' 12 or develop the record as to whether claim 13
covered all substantial applications of the method, both of which are
important facts for consideration." 13 Respondent Metabolite may have
argued for different claim interpretations of terms that were
construed, such as "correlating", so that "assay" and "correlating" did
not cover substantially all uses of a natural phenomenon." 4 The
110. See Solicitor General Brief 1, supra note 97, at 15.
1. a. Petitioner did not challenge the validity of claim 13 under the natural
phenomenon doctrine in either of the lower courts, and neither of those courts
addressed the question. Indeed, petitioner did not mount any challenge, under any
theory, to the patentability of the claimed subject matter under Section 101.
Instead, petitioner argued that claim 13 is invalid for indefiniteness, lack of
written description, lack of enablement, anticipation, and obviousness. Pet. Corr.
C.A. Br. 38-52.
111. Seeid at 15-16.
In the court of appeals, petitioner did allude to the natural phenomenon
argument in the course of arguing that claim 13 is indefinite because it does not
describe the "correlation" step with sufficient specificity. Pet. Corr. C.A. Br. 41.
In particular, petitioner noted in passing that if its indefiniteness challenge were
rejected, respondent CTI "would improperly gain a monopoly over a basic
scientific a t rather than any novel invention of its own. The law is settled that
no such claim should be allowed." Ibid. (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185).
Petitioner advanced that cursory argument solely in support of its indefiniteness
challenge, however, not as a separate challenge under Section § 101.
112. See id. at 9.
Because petitioner did not argue below that claim 13 attempts to claim non-
patentable subject matter and is therefore invalid under section 101 (see pp. 15-
16, infra), the courts did not focus on the term "assay" or otherwise address claim
13 "as a whole." Indeed, the lower courts did not interpret the claim term "assay"
at all. See Pet. App. 13a.
113. See id. at 10.
The record is also not well developed on the question whether the process
claimed in claim 13 comprises every "substantial practical application" of the
natural relationship between elevated total homocysteine and deficiencies in the
B vitamins. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72; p. 8, supra. Indeed, there appears to
be nothing in the record that directly addresses the question whether there are
other practical applications that qualify as "substantial" within the meaning of
Benson.
This discussion about "covering every substantial practical application" relates to process
claims, not products. It is generally accepted that product claims cover all uses of the product.
114. See id. at 19.
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Solicitor General went on to explain that the Supreme Court still had
the discretion to hear the case, but should defer.' 15 Any decision that
would issue would likely have a significant impact on the biotech
industry as thousands of patents had been issued by the PTO based on
the understanding that this subject matter was patentable and the
health care community had come to rely on this patent coverage."
16
There were substantial reasons for the relevant issues to be fully
vetted before a decision. The Solicitor General concluded by saying,
"[b]ut if this Court were to consider reevaluating almost a quarter-
century of administrative practice and lower court jurisprudence, it
should do so based on a full record in a case where the issue was
properly raised, litigated, and decided below.""
7
On October 31, 2005, the Supreme Court granted the petition for
certiorari only with respect to whether claim 13 was unpatentable
because it fell within one of the three exceptions to statutory subject
matter; a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea. Within
two months approximately 20 Amicus briefs were filed."l
8
2. The Substantive Issues
The Solicitor General also discussed the substantive law
regarding the above exceptions to patentability under 35 U.S.C.
But because of petitioner's failure to rely on Flook's inventiveness requirement
below (or to raise any objection to patentability under Section 101), respondents
had no incentive to argue in favor of a limiting construction of the patent, and the
lower courts had no occasion to determine whether the patent could or should be
read narrowly in light of that consideration. That failure to develop the contours
of the claim in the context of the natural phenomenon issue is significant. As
Flook explained and the dissent in Diehr repeatedly observed, the critical starting
point in determining the validity of a claim for purposes of the natural
phenomenon doctrine "is an understanding of what the inventor claims to have
discovered." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 205 (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord id. at 193-
194; Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (noting that it is necessary "to determine what type
of discovery is sought to be patented.").
115. Seeid. atl6-17.
116. See id. at 14.
Since this Court decided Diehr almost 25 years ago, PTO has generally followed
the Federal Circuit's understanding that Diehr substantially limited Flook, and
has issued numerous patents based on that understanding - including patents on
medical diagnostic methods, other types of diagnostic and testing procedures, and
computer-related processes. A decision overturning PTO's approach could call
into question a substantial number of patent claims and undermine the settled
expectations of numerous participants in technology-based industries.
117. See id. at 19.
118. See Docket for 04-607, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126
S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-607.htm
[hereinafter Court Docket).
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§ 101.'19 The main Supreme Court decisions that were discussed in
the Solicitor's Brief, as well as the amicus briefs, included
Diamond v. Diehr, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Parker v. Flook,
Gottshalk v. Benson, and Funk Bros. v. Kalo Inoculant. These
decisions refined the scope of what is eligible for patent protection
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and what may be unpatentable as one of the
above exceptions.
The Solicitor General stated that the scope of patentable subject
matter is usually broad, 120 but that the issue in this case was as
follows:
Claim 13 appears to involve such a natural phenomenon,
because it asserts and relies on the existence of a naturally
occurring correlation between elevated levels of total
homocysteine and deficiencies in cobalamin or folate. The asserted
natural relationship between elevated total homocysteine and
deficiencies in the B vitamins appears to be an unpatentable
"principle in natural philosophy or physical science," Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) at 116, just as the relationship between energy,
mass, and the speed of light discovered by Einstein (E=mc 2), and
the relationship between force of attraction, mass, and distance
discovered by Newton (the law of gravity), are unpatentable
natural phenomena. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. To the
extent that the relationship is no more than an observable, naturally
occurring fact of human physiology, it is also analogous to
observations of the properties of bacterial strains and metals, which
this Court has held to be unpatentable. See Funk, 333 U.S. at
130. 121
Various amicus briefs concurred that claim 13 was not
unpatentable because it involved a law of nature or natural
phenomenon, since patents rely on laws of nature to some degree.
122
The tests for statutory subject matter in the Supreme Court decisions
show that the application of a law of nature is only the beginning of
the inquiry. 23 There are guidelines as to whether the application of a
119. See generally Solicitor General Brief 11, supra note 109, at 17-27.
120. See Solicitor General Brief 1, supra note 97, at 5.
121. See id. at 6-7.
122. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981); see also Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 172 (1948); Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 6-7.
123. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. "It is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection."
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law of nature is patentable.124 For example, the Solicitor General's
brief identified two critical factors that should be addressed once one
of the exceptions to statutory subject matter (like a law of nature) is
implicated in a process claim. The Solicitor General asked: 1) did the
claimed process transform an article into a different state or thing, and
2) did the claim cover all substantial uses of the method? 12' The
Solicitor General suggested that if the answer to the first question was
"no", or if the answer to the second question was "yes," then the
claim was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Solicitor General also suggested that another question
needed to be answered: namely, whether the law of nature was
associated with the inventive concept of the claim.' 26 The Solicitor
General stated that it was unclear whether the Supreme Court had
overruled their decision in Parker v. Flook, with their holding in
Diamond v Diehr.127 Diehr quoted Flook as stating that "the discovery
of [a natural] phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is
some other inventive concept in its application."' 128 In addition, Diehr
noted that Flook was merely trying to patent a mathematical formula,
whereas Diehr was seeking to patent the application of a
mathematical formula in a method for curing rubber.' 29 Flook was
further distinguished in Diehr because their claim lacked sufficient
124. See id. at 213 n.36. Even when a patent purports to apply a phenomenon of nature as
part of a patentable process, the inquiry is not over:
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the
notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more
fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the
statute was enacted to protect. [Flook,] 437 U.S. at 593.
Thus, it is necessary "to determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented." Diehr, 450
U.S. at 213 n.36.
125. See Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 10 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)).
126. Seeid. at ll.
This Court explained that 'once th[e] algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention.'
[Flook, 437 U.S.] at 594. Instead, the patent claim was merely 'comparable to a
claim that the formula 2-ra can be usefully applied in determining the
circumference of a wheel.' [Flook, 437 U.S.] at 595.
Under Flook, therefore, an applicant could not claim patentable subject matter merely by setting
forth a method that transformed matter and that did not claim all substantial practical
applications of a natural phenomenon. Instead, the claim, considered as a whole, also had to
contain some inventive aspect other than the natural phenomenon itself.
127. Id. at 17.
128. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (emphasis added).
129. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-93.
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details for use outside the mathematical formula.130 The Diehr Court
explained that natural phenomenon are not patentable in isolation and
that the claim as a whole must be considered. 131 As a result, the
Solicitor General suggested that it was unclear if the Flook test was
still valid, or whether the Diehr test for the claim "as a whole" had
substantially limited Flook.132 That question would affect the
substantive outcome in this appeal and they suggested that it needed
to be addressed.
133
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the government
discussed several other issues in its December 23, 2005 brief. For
example, it addressed the invalidity issues of indefiniteness
enablement, written description, and anticipation. 134 It concluded that
claim 13 satisfied all of the above requirements under 35 U.S.C. §
112. 135 However, it stated that the claim could be anticipated based on
the treatment given by the courts below.'
36
The government also commented on the statutory subject matter
questions that were raised in their earlier brief, i.e. transformation and
preemption. 137 The Solicitor General stated: "Claim 13 appears to
satisfy that test because the various methods of assaying for total
homocysteine that are described in the record entail significant
physical or chemical alteration of a sample of blood or other bodily
fluid.'
38
The government went into some depth on the issue of whether
claim 13 covered all substantial applications of the law of nature.
39
As to the specific facts presented in LabCorp, the Solicitor General
stated that the jury's findings and the judge's comments suggested
that the claim covered all substantial applications. 40 Nevertheless, the
130. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support
of Respondent at 11-12, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings y. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921
(2006) (No. 04-607), 2006 WL 303907 (hereinafter AIPLA Brief).
131. Id. at 12. ("The Diehr Court explained that although laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable in isolation, if the claim as a whole recites an
application of a mathematical formula to a new and useful process, section 101 is satisfied.")
132. See Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 17; Solicitor General Brief II, supra
note 109, at 21 n.4.
133. See Solicitor General Brief II, supra note 109, at 21 n.4.
134. See id. at 7-14, 28-30.
135. Seeid. at 7-14.
136. See id. at 28-30.
137. Id. at 17-29.
138. Id. at21 n.4.
139. Id. at 22-29.
140. Id. at 22-23.
20081
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Solicitor General asserted that the case was not positioned for review
as the issue had not been argued at the District Court or Federal
Circuit.' 4  However, the Solicitor General hypothesized that there
were some potential non-infringing applications, such as testing
something other than blood (tissue) and correlating without
measuring. 142 If so, then the claim would not cover all substantial
applications.
The discussion concerning all substantial uses was integral to the
anticipation discussion. For example, if the claim covered all
homocysteine assays as enjoined by the judge, then it covered any
assays that were previously developed. 143 As with the section 101
issue, the Solicitor General felt that the anticipation issue was not
"fairly included."'
144
Other amicus briefs supporting Metabolite generally focused on
the Supreme Court decisions, which were expansive as to what
constituted patentable subject matter. For example, Diehr was quoted
as saying that the courts should not read limitations into patent laws
that the legislature has not expressed, 145 along with Diamond v.
Chakrabarty which suggests a broader reading of section 101 by
stating that "anything under the sun that is made by man" would be
patentable. 146 Supporting non-Supreme Court decisions include In re
Allappat and State Street Bank, as they followed the Diehr
rationale. 147
The district court instructed the jury that it should find petitioner liable for
contributory infringement if, among other things, the total homocysteine assays
performed by petitioner were not "capable of substantial noninfringing use." By
finding petitioner liable for contributory infringement, the jury necessarily
concluded that no substantial non-infringing uses of the total homocysteine
assays had been proven on the trial record.
(citation omitted). The Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court's injunction to any and all
homocysteine assays which would cover all substantial uses of the test. Id. at 24.
141. Id. at22-24.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Id. at 29.
144. Id. at 6-7.
145. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 182 (1981).
146. See AIPLA Brief, supra note 130, at 9; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980).
147. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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The briefs in support of LabCorp generally focused on the
requirement for transforming an article or thing from Benson.,48 They
also relied on the public policy concerns regarding the breadth of
patents and their power to exclude. 149 Some briefs discussed prior art
related issues which are typically irrelevant to the issue of patentable
subject matter under section 101.150 One brief analogized the
exceptions to section 101 in terms of the copyright merger doctrine by
stating that when the idea or fact and expression are inseparable,
copying the expression will not be barred.' 51 Applying this logic to
patentability, if the claim encompassed substantially all of the uses for
the method, then the claim was unpatentable.' 52
3. Policy Issues from the Amicus Briefs
The amicus briefs were approximately evenly split in supporting
both parties, and several supported neither party.' 53 The amici
included the Intellectual Property Owners Association, People's
Medical Society, United States Government, American Clinical
Laboratory Association, Financial Services Industry, Patients Not
Patents, Inc., International Business Machines Corporation,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, American Express
Company, Computer & Communications Industry Association,
Affymetrix, Inc. and Professor John H. Barton, American Medical
Association, AARP, Public Patent Foundation, Franklin Pierce Law
Center, Boston Patent Law Association, Perlegen Sciences, Inc. and
Mohr, Davidow Ventures, and the Federal Circuit Bar Association.
154
148. See Brief of the American Clinical Laboratory Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 18, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct.
2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3543098 (hereinafter American Clinical Lab. Brief).
149. See Brief for Amici Curiae Affymetrix., Inc. and Professor John H. Barton in Support
of Petitioner at 14-15, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921
(2006) (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3597814 (hereinafter Affymetrix Brief).
150. Brief of the American Heart Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
17, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607),
2005 WL 3561169 [hereinafter American Heart Ass'n Brief]; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
People's Medical Society in Support of Petitioner at 19-21, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3597702 [hereinafter
People's Med. Soc. Brief].
151. Brief of the Public Patent Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
15-16, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-
607), 2005 WL 3597813 [hereinafter Public Patent Found. Brief].
152. Id.
153. See Court Docket, supra note 118.
154. Id.
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As stated by Justice Breyer, the Court can obtain information on
the facts and law from the parties' briefs, but the amicus briefs are
generally most helpful on issues of public policy and how the cases
would affect the groups represented by the authors.155 Indeed, the
amicus briefs raised interesting policy arguments on both sides of the
debate. For example, one side was concerned about the loss of access
to diagnostic tests, the affects on health care and costs for these
services, while the other side discussed policies for encouraging
innovation and the economic consequences which accompany the loss
of patent protection for inventor's discoveries.
One main policy argument asserted that critical health care tests
will become unavailable if patented because of the preclusive effect
of patents. 156 Restricted access for diagnostic tests for the BRCA gene
was given as an example. 157 One brief discussed privatization of
correlations between genes and their functions. 158 They stated that
obtaining a patent on the correlation between a genetic sequence and
its function would put the ability to control research and scientific
investigation into private hands.' 59 They mentioned that this problem
becomes more significant as research goes beyond the one gene, one
disease model and into areas that require many multiples of genes to
uncover the underlying basis for disease. 60 This is a very real concern
as researchers are using tools that contain all known human gene
sequences in one test.' 6' If one or more patentees can control a
particular gene or its correlation, then they may foreclose the larger
experiments and the discovery of further correlations with other genes
or diseases.
Another brief stated that physicians would no longer be able to
prescribe diagnostic tests for homocysteine, and other briefs extended
155. See Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Genetic Advances and Legal Institutions, 28
J.L. MED. & ETHics 23, 24-25 (2000).
156. American Clinical Lab. Brief, supra note 148, at 8-9.
157. Affymetrix Brief, supra note 149, at 18.
158. Id. at 16-20. Generally, gene patents have been determined to have utility, but some
have questioned their ability to pass the "originality" standard. See Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten
Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 261 (2005).
159. Affymetrix Brief, supra note 149, at 16-17.
160. Id. at 18.
161. Affymetrix sells nucleic acid probe arrays that have this capability. See Affymetrix,
Products: Gene Chip Arrays, http://www.affymetrix.con/products/arrays/index.affx (last visited
Oct. 23, 2007).
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this idea to all current diagnostic tests. 62 These briefs suggest that
there would be a negative impact on the physician/patient relationship
if claim 13 was upheld.163 Other amici suggested that claim 13 would
deter physicians from ordering diagnostic tests or obtaining genotype
information. 164
The specific fact situation presented in LabCorp may not be
representative of every dispute in similar situations, but it did not
appear that the litigation would have affected access to homocysteine
tests because the dispute was simply over a royalty owed under a
preexisting agreement. Therefore, no physician would have to forego
a test for total homocysteine. With respect to the general issue of
patient access to tests, one brief countered that patents with claims
similar to claim 13 have been around for some time and there was no
evidence presented that physicians were ever sued under the '658
patent. Furthermore, physicians would not be sued under currently
typical diagnostic test patents. 65 Health care, like many industries, is
practiced in an environment where patented inventions are used
constantly and they do not limit access to care. 166 In fact, one brief
162. See Brief for the American Medical Association, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 25, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006)
(No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3597812 [hereinafter AMA Brief].
163. See also American Heart Ass'n Brief, supra note 150, at 24-26; People's Med. Soc.
Brief, supra note 150, at 23.
164. See Affymetrix Brief, supra note 149, at 16.
165. Brief for Amici Curiae Perlegen Sciences, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents at 20-
21, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607),
2006 WL 303908 [hereinafter Perlegen Brief]; see also Brief for Respondents at 48, Lab. Corp.
of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2006 WL
303905 [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
Petitioner is a for-profit company that is seeking to maximize its revenue by
avoiding the royalties due respondents under the licensing agreement that
petitioner previously entered into. There is not a shred of evidence in the record
that petitioner's payment of royalties to respondents, or the ultimate cost of the
homocysteine assays performed by petitioner, have ever affected a single
doctor's treatment decision. There is absolutely no evidence that, if the judgment
below were affirmed (or the writ dismissed), any patient's care, or the cost of that
care, would change in any way.
Respondents' Brief at 48.
166. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at 48-49.
Patented inventions are common in the field of medicine. In addition to
diagnostic methods, a physician may employ diagnostic machinery (such as an
MRI machine), medical devices (such as implants or prosthetics), and of course a
wide range of pharmaceuticals, all of which may be covered by one or more
patents. For this reason, AARP's assertion (Br. 9) that claim 13 "would prohibit
physicians from practicing good medicine without a patent license" proves far
too much. "Good medicine" may in fact require physicians to practice patented
inventions on a daily basis - by engaging in patented diagnostic methods, by
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asserted that patents do not negatively affect testing as the diagnostic
market is accelerating, not decelerating.' 67 These factors suggest that
diagnostic tests should be more available in the future, not less
available as asserted. Access to diagnostic tests may be less related to
patents than to health insurance related reimbursement issues.
It was also asserted that patents would increase the cost of health
care by requiring that a health care provider postpone a diagnosis to
do a patent search.' 68 However, the briefs did not show any evidence
that physicians have ever performed patent searches or have impeded
their patient relationship, even though diagnostic patent claims have
been around for many years. 69 Also, it seems evident that even if
claim 13 were unpatentable, it would not change a
researcher/physician's duty to perform a search for otherwise relevant
patents. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the disposition of claim 13
would affect this hypothetical situation either way.
It was also asserted that the public would be excluded from the
use of any newly discovered natural law, and that if the decision is
affirmed, "the availability of new and improved tests would be
entirely at the mercy of the person who first discovered the natural
correlation.' '170 As stated above, it is clear that an applicant can obtain
a patent applying a correlation of a natural phenomenon. 171 Indeed,
this is the basis for many patents. In the medical field, it is a
correlation between disease and drug that is important for
pharmaceutical companies and the correlation between marker and
disease for diagnostic companies. It is simply a question of
using patented devices, or by prescribing patented pharmaceuticals. Although the
patent regime may increase (or decrease) the cost of patient care, Congress has
made the policy judgment that the benefits of increased innovation provided by
the patent system justify any distortions that patents might introduce into the
healthcare delivery system.
167. See Perlegen Brief, supra note 165, at 21.
168. See People's Med. Soc. Brief, supra note 150, at 22.
169. See generally Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at 48-49.
170. See American Clinical Lab. Brief, supra note 148, at 9.
171. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Perlegen Brief, supra note 165, at 11;
Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 14. See also Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at
46:
And pharmaceutical companies could not patent methods of treating conditions
such as depression, Alzheimer's, or heart disease with drugs, since they have
merely discovered that certain chemicals interact with the human body in ways
directed by chemistry and patented practical applications of such discovered
interactions. CfDiehr, 450 U.S. at 189 n. 12 ("To accept the analysis proffered by
the petitioner would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions unpatentable
because all inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of nature which,
once known, make their implementation obvious.").
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formulating the claims in such a way so as not to run afoul of the
exceptions to patentability that have been identified by the above
cases, most notably, the transformation requirement and the
preemption issue. Even if claim 13 were invalid in its current form,
the essence of the correlation may be claimed in another form.
Consequently, claims of some relevant breadth could still exist.
However, drafting a patentable claim will require a compromise
between compliance with section 101 and claim scope. The Solicitor
General's December 23, 2005 brief asserts that the narrower a claim
is drafted, the more likely it will not cover all substantial uses of a
natural law. 172 However, the usefulness of the claim may then be
negated. Also, claiming a transformation step will limit claim scope,
as a particular transformation may require a limitation that relates to a
specific embodiment of an invention. It may be true that narrowing a
claim will lessen the issues under section 101, but the consequence is
that its value is diminished.
First Amendment issues were also raised by some of the amicus
briefs, 173 asserting that claims similar to claim 13 would chill free
speech, restrict the dissemination of medical info and abridge the
right to think because actions may be regarded as potential patent
infringement. 74 Regarding the conflict between the First Amendment
and infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271 defines the elements of patent
infringement: publication and dissemination of information are not
infringement by themselves. If published information is relevant to a
claimed method, then the patentee still needs to show how the
defendant's conduct satisfied the other limits of the claims.'
75
172. Solicitor General Brief II, supra note 109, at 28.
173. People's Med. Soc. Brief, supra note 150, at 17-19; Public Patent Found. Brief, supra
note 151, at 17; Affymetrix Brief, supra note 149, at 26.
174. People's Med. Soc. Brief, supra note 150, at 19:
The Federal Circuit held that LabCorp indirectly infringed claim 13 of the '658
patent by publishing basic scientific information. Such a holding chills the
exercise of freedom of speech. This result denies physicians hoping to treat ill
patients access to basic scientific information and restricts the ability of other
scientists to undertake further research regarding the information and publish the
results of that research.
(citations omitted).
175. See supra note 97 for a discussion of infringement by multiple parties. See also
Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at 38:
In any event, claim 13 is only infringed when the assaying and correlating
steps are both performed, sequentially, for the purpose of diagnosing vitamin
deficiencies. The act of assaying body fluids for total homocysteine for reasons
other than diagnosing vitamin deficiencies would not infringe. Nor would the act
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Publication alone would not fit within the assaying limitation of claim
13 and therefore there would be no danger in publication and
dissemination of scientifically relevant information.' 76 It should be
remembered that LabCorp provided articles that commercially
benefited their assaying business. Publication would not constitute
infringement of the typical diagnostic claim, which generally requires
an active step to obtain a sample for analysis, or some other action not
generally associated with publication. Consequently, claims of this
type should not abridge First Amendment rights by mere publication.
It was also argued that LabCorp was simply publishing old
information about a natural phenomenon and that they should not be
able to prevent this activity. 177 This assertion confuses the issues and
attempts to raise a prior art argument in the discussion regarding
statutory subject matter.178 As mentioned above, it is not relevant in
the context of section 101. Additionally, the prior art and other
validity issues were not at issue at the Supreme Court and were
resolved in favor of the patentees by the Federal Circuit. 79 Also, the
information in the briefs suggested that these inventors, who were
medical school professors, were the first to describe the method to
detect homocysteine and the correlation between homocysteine and
the vitamin deficiencies. 80 Neither discovery was known until the
inventors published their findings and then persuaded their colleagues
of correlating alone, or what petitioner calls "thinking about" the relationship
between total homocysteine and vitamin deficiencies.
176. See supra note 97 for split infringement discussion. See also Respondents' Brief,
supra note 165, at 38 n.18:
[S]ee MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005) ('The classic
case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces
commission of infringement by another, or entices or persuades another to
infringe, as by advertising') (internal quotation and citation omitted). Whether
other persons or entities infringe the '658 patent is separate question on which no
evidence was presented below.
177. People's Med. Soc. Brief, supra note 150, at 19-20. See also Public Patent Found.,
supra note 151, at 17; see also Affymetrix Brief, supra note 149, at 25-26.
178. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. in Support of
Neither Party at 8-9, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921
(2006) (No. 04-607) (showing that a section analysis does not incorporate issues of other
sections such as 102, 103 or 112).
179. Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 109, at 28-30. But see generally Metabolite
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366-68 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (where
claims could be anticipated based on the jury findings and the judge's injunction).
180. Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at 3-4 ("The Inventors were the first to study the
relationship between total homocysteine and deficiencies of cobalamin and folate. In fact, they
were the first to even measure total homocysteine in patients with known cobalamin or folate
deficiencies.").
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of the usefulness of the assay and correlation. 18 1 Therefore, the
inference that they were not the first inventors was misplaced.
Policy arguments supporting patentability for claim 13 under
section 101 asserted that, without a broad reading of patentable
subject matter, there would no longer be incentives for research
leading to future invention and that innovation would stagnate if there
was less protection for diagnostic inventions.' 82 In other words, if
there is no prospective financial benefit or if there is lack of
commercial protection from larger companies, then smaller
companies will not expend the time and money to invent or bring
health care inventions to market in the first place. Diagnostic tests
will trend towards those methods that are older and proven since there
will be less incentive for developing/discovering new tests. Large
diagnostic companies would be more likely to use existing tests
without the need to advance. Companies will not perform research
directed at finding a workaround as there would be no need to do so
and no reward once they found it. Also, if there is no seed money for
small diagnostic or biotechnology companies, funding will move to
other industries which are entitled to patent coverage and the United
States position in biotech will erode. One example, illustrating how
policy changes shift investment in research, is the movement out of
the country due to the lack of funding for stem cell research in the
United States. 
83
However, it is generally recognized that patent protection for
new ideas fosters innovation.'184 One brief specifically showed how a
non-patent form of exclusivity can increase the incentives to address
the needs of public health.' 85 The example is the Orphan Drug Act of
1983, which sets up a mechanism to provide exclusive rights to a
party who develops a disease treatment for diseases that do not have a
broad base of affected individuals, thereby making health care more
available to the public.' 86 This exclusivity benefits consumers by
bringing drugs to the people that would otherwise not have received
them and can be likened to the exclusivity provided by patents.
181. See id. at 4-5.
182. See Brief Amicus Curiae Franklin Pierce Law Center in Support of Respondents at
17-19 & n.10, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006) (No.
04-607) [hereinafter Franklin Pierce Brief]; Perlegen Brief, supra note 165, at 18-19.
183. See Matthew Herper & Robert Langreth, Anti-ban Billionaires, FORBES MAG.,
Sept. 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/forbes/2006/0904/124.html.
184. See generally Franklin Pierce Brief, supra note 182, at 13-19.
185. Seeid. at 17-18.
186. See id. at 17-19.
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Accordingly, granting patents would similarly serve the policy of
encouraging innovation as well as providing greater access to health
care and diagnostic tests.
Another important policy reason was the negative effect on
many other patent claims if claim 13 was held unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101.' The Solicitor General stated: "[a] decision
overturning the PTO's approach could call into question a substantial
number of patent claims and undermine the settled expectations of
numerous participants in technology-based industries.', 88 A simple
search of U.S. patents on the USPTO database shows that there are
many patents that use "correlating" in the claim. One brief explained:
"[v]irtually every patent claim concerning a diagnostic method is
based, explicitly or implicitly, on a medical condition. Thus, the
repercussions for biotechnology, particularly diagnostics, if the
decision below were reversed would be staggering."' 89 They list
fundamental patents to Bayer on PSA, Stanford for HIV/AIDS,
University of California for HER-2/neu, and Johns Hopkins for
cancer, as examples. 190 Additionally, depending on its scope, a
decision adverse to Metabolite could overturn twenty-five years or
more of case law both at the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court.' 9 1 As the Solicitor General stated, overturning this precedent
would have a tremendous effect on companies of all sizes. Business
plans would be tossed out the window with tremendous upheaval in
expected returns. Shareholders and other investors would lose money
or be wary of investing in ventures that were dependant on patented
products, assays, or other methods. Consequently, several amicus
briefs stated that it was good policy to either not decide the issue in
this case because it was not fully vetted, decide it in a narrow way, or
hold in favor of patentability.'
92
Other briefs stated that it was hard to apply the law of nature
exception and that Congress wants a broad definition of what is
patentable. 193 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Funk Bros.
187. See Perlegen Brief, supra note 165, at 11. See generally Solicitor General Brief II,
supra note 109, at 14.
188. Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 14.
189. Perlegen Brief, supra note 165, at 11.
190. See id. at 12-13.
191. See Respondents' Brief, supra note 165, at 44; Solicitor General Brief I, supra note
97, at 14, 15 n.*.
192. See, e.g., Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 15.
193. See, e.g., Franklin Pierce Brief, supra note 182, at 26-29.
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supports this view. 194 It could be argued that the system needs to have
a broad view of utility due to the emergence of new technologies
which may not fit neatly into existing categories.1 95 Otherwise, a
policy is set to selectively discriminate against particular technologies
by favoring one industry over another. In the area of statutory subject
matter, the industries include biotechnology, diagnostics, and
emerging markets such as signal processing and business methods.
4. The Decision
The hearing was March 21, 2006 and the case was dismissed as
improvidently granted on June 22, 2006.196 A dissent was written by
Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. 197
5. The Dissent
Justice Breyer felt that the Court should exercise their discretion
to decide the issues because they already had enough information to
do so.198 He stated that there was no practical reason for not hearing
the case, that neither the factual record nor the briefing was
inadequate, no party claimed prejudice, and there was no unfair
gamesmanship.199  He stated that even though lower court
consideration is helpful, he believed that it was more important to
clarify the law in this area sooner than later.
20 0
With respect to the substantive issues and policy considerations,
Justice Breyer stated that "the process described in claim 13 is not a
process for transforming blood or any other matter.",20 1 His comments
focus on the purpose of the physical transformation by requiring that
194. See generally Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134-35
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
195. See generally Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining A Scientific Public
Domain, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 519, 520-23 (2006).
196. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006);
Supreme Court of the U.S., Hearing List (Mar. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/hearinglists/hearinglist-mar06.pdf.
197. Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2921 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2922.
In my view, we should not dismiss the writ. The question presented is not
unusually difficult. We have the authority to decide it. We said that we would do
so. The parties and amici have fully briefed the question. And those who engage
in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as patients depend upon
proper health care, might well benefit from this Court's authoritative answer.
199. See id. at 2926.
200. See id
201. Id. at 2927.
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it be related to the novel aspect of the claim.2 °2 He also criticized the
assaying step by stating that it can employ any test at all, suggesting
that there should be something inventive in this part of the claim.20 3
The Solicitor General did not make the same distinction and would
accept that there was a physical transformation in claim 13 .204 It is
irrelevant that the step is not patented unless Justice Breyer believed
that Flook is more controlling than Diehr.
Justice Breyer also addressed the "useful, concrete and tangible
result" test set out in State Street Bank and said that the Supreme
Court had never authorized such a test "and, if taken literally...
would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary." 205
This statement also signals that the Supreme Court is interested in
cutting back on the breadth of statutory subject matter set out by the
Federal Circuit. These comments are already being applied at the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which questioned the
above test in Ex parte Glenner as discussed later in this article.
However, this test is still in use at the Federal Circuit.
The dissent concluded that the physical transformation step is
irrelevant because claim 13 covers any test.20 6 Justice Breyer claimed
that the limitation preempts all substantial uses of the law of nature
and therefore is inapplicable as a claim limitation. 20 7 Instead, he
focused on the correlating limitation and concluded his analysis by
saying that claim 13 simply described a natural process in the abstract
language of a process and that it is just an instruction to read some
numbers in light of medical knowledge.20 8 One can always claim any
process as a series of steps, but the question is what the steps
embody.20 9 Is it a natural phenomenon or not? These comments
suggest that the dissent wants more actual, physical limits in claims,
to make them narrower across the board.
Justice Breyer concluded with the public policy argument that
uncertainty in this area threatens the medical profession and stated
that a decision would reduce legal uncertainty. 2 10 He also echoed
202. See id. at 2927-28.
203. Id.
204. Solicitor General Brief I, supra note 97, at 9-10; Solicitor General Brief II, supra note
109, at 21 n.4.
205. Lab. Corp., 126 S.Ct. at 2928 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2927.
207. See id. at 2922-28.
208. See id. at 2928.
209.- Id.
210. See id. at 2928-29.
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concerns that physicians have to spend time searching and licensing
patents, diverting them from practicing medicine which, in turn,
drives up health care costs. 21' His last comments expressed an interest
in having a debate between the generalists and the specialists over
whether "the patent system, as currently administered and enforced,
adequately reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal patent
laws... embod[y]. '21 2 However, once the Supreme Court has spoken
on an issue, that usually ends the discussion. Clearly, one can see that
this Supreme Court is quite willing to reevaluate and challenge some
longstanding intellectual property case law as they have shown in
several decisions in the last few years.
It is possible that the full court would have found the claim
unpatentable because of the policy arguments recited in the Breyer
dissent. Recent Supreme Court opinions have favored policy concerns
that have narrowed intellectual property protection.213 Other policy
arguments that could be persuasive relate to fostering public health;
allowing public dissemination of important health information;
promoting the physician/patient relationship; and lowering the costs
of diagnostic tests. However, it is not clear that less protection for
intellectual property will achieve those goals.
The Court could also hold that the Flook test is still alive and
some element of novelty needs to be in the claim outside of the law of
nature limitation. Application to these facts could mean that claim 13
was unpatentable as the assaying step was not new.
IV. DECISIONS ISSUED AFTER LABCORP
We will not know how the Supreme Court would have decided
the utility issues in LabCorp or how they will decide these issues
when they return to the Court. We do know that the justices are
interested in resolving intellectual property issues generally and have
expressed interest in this particular issue. The chances are good that
the Court will address statutory subject matter soon. It is evident that
a block of three justices would have decided that claim 13 was
directed to nonstatutory subject matter. 4 Would any other two
211. Id. at2928.
212. Id. at 2929 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
213. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
214. See generally Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (with whom
Stevens, J., and Souter, J., joined). See also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
International, Inc., 534 US 124 (2001), where Justices Breyer and Stevens dissented from the
holding that plants could be subject of utility patents.
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justices follow suit if the question was fully developed in the lower
courts?
The following discussion is a survey of case law decided after
LabCorp and may be helpful in understanding the impact and the
social context for the Supreme Court decision yet to come. Several of
the later decisions have issued from the Board of Appeals and
Interferences of the U.S. Patent Office. 215 Two were decided at the
Federal Circuit and one from a District Court infringement action.216
The number of section 101 appeals has increased in the last year, in
part because, like the Supreme Court, the Board and the Federal
Circuit have been raising the utility issue sua sponte.217 The claimed
subject matter in the appeals has been largely in the computer
algorithm and signals area and one commentator observed that the
Board has justified their conservative view of utility under section
101 by referring to cases that have been overruled or disfavored.21 8 In
their decisions, the Board has discussed older Supreme Court and pre-
State Street Bank precedent in distinguishing State Street Bank,219 as
well as similar decisions such as Arrhythmia, ATT and In re
Alappatt.220 The only recent District Court action relates to a patent
claiming a schedule for immunizing mammals, and is therefore more
similar to LabCorp than the Board and Federal Circuit cases.
215. Exparte Casazza, Appeal No. 2006-2228, 2006 WL 2794039 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 6, 2007)
(signal); Exparte Glenner, Appeal No. 2007-1089, 2007 WL 1874818 (B.P.A.I. June 28, 2007);
Ex parte Gutta, Appeal No. 2006-2107, 2007 WL 1766997 (B.P.A.I. June 11, 2007); Ex parte
Jakobsson, Appeal No. 2006-2107, 2007 WL 1371371 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 16, 2007); Ex parte
Rising, Appeal No. 2007-0438, 2007 WL 1033504 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 20, 2007) (processing
method); Exparte Keohane, Appeal No. 2006-3121, 2007 WL 375026 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 31, 2007)
(data processing); Ex parte Hartmann, Appeal No. 2006-1607, 2006 WL 2700810 (B.P.A.I.
Sept. 13, 2006) (signal); Exparte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.1.
Mar. 8, 2006).
216. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
217. See Peter Zura, "Waiting for Nuijten" - 101 Rejections at the BPAI (part 2), Sept. 12,
2007, http://271 patent.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-nuijten- 101-rejections-at_ 12.html;
Peter Zura, "Waiting for Nuijten" - 101 Rejections at the BPAI (part 1), Sept. 11, 2007,
http://271 patent.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-nuijten- 101 -rejections-at.html.
218. See Peter Zura, "Waiting for Nuijten" - 101 Rejections at the BPAI (part 1), Sept. 11,
2007, http://271 patent.blogspot.com/2007/09/waiting-for-nuijten- 101 -rejections-at.html.
(referring to In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A.
1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
219. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
220. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research Tech. Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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A. Ex Parte Bilski
221
Two other appeals arrived at the Federal Circuit prior to Bilski:
In re Comiskey and In re Nuijten. However, the Board discussed its
section 101 analysis more extensively in Bilski, which is still in the
briefing stages at the Federal Circuit. 
2 2
The invention is claimed as a non-machine implemented
business method: hedging risks associated with commodity price.223 It
is a business method patent without a physical device or physical
transformation. The PTO rejected the claims solely under 35 U.S.C. §
101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter, stating that "the
bounds of patentable subject matter are increasingly being tested"
with non-computer implemented process claims.224 The Board stated
that non-machine implemented methods can be problematic as they
are able to cover abstract ideas, which is a common theme for
algorithm claims. 225 The Board applied many of the tests from prior
221. Exparte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006).
222. See id. at *24. The same section 101 issue was raised during the oral hearing by
Chief Judge Michel in In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007), requiring
supplemental briefing.
223. See Bilski, 2006 WL 4080055 at * 1. This opinion was not designated for publication.
The invention relates to a method practiced by a commodity provider for
managing (i.e., hedging) the consumption risks associated with a commodity sold
at a fixed price. It is disclosed that energy consumers face two kinds of risk: price
risk and consumption risk (specification, p. 1). The proliferation of price risk
management tools over the last 5 years before the filing date allows easy
management of price risk (specification, p. 2). However, consumption risk (e.g.,
the need to use more or less energy than planned due to the weather) is said to be
not currently managed in energy markets, which is the problem addressed by the
invention (specification, p. 2).
Claim I is reproduced below.
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider
and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-
risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider
and said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of
market participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of
consumer transactions.
224. Id. at *3.
225. See id. at *2.
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precedent and noted that the present claims did not have any of the
common attributes that convey patentability under section 101.226
The steps of claim 1: do not recite any specific way of
implementing the steps; do not expressly or impliedly recite any
physical transformation of physical subject matter, tangible or
intangible, from one state into another; do not recite any electrical,
chemical, or mechanical acts or results; do not directly or
indirectly recite transforming data by a mathematical or non-
mathematical algorithm; are not required to be performed on a
machine, such as a computer, either as claimed or disclosed; could
be performed entirely by human beings; and do not involve making
or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
227
Judge Barrett wrote the decision and pointed to Ex parte
Lundgren as discussing the legal analysis of statutory subject matter
and went through the stepwise analysis set out in the Interim
Guidelines, the PTO test for patentability under section 101.228 He
focused on the definition of the word "process" and identified it as the
most difficult category of section 101 to define because these claims
do not recite structure and can therefore be more abstract.229 One key
feature for defining a process is whether the subject matter is
physically transformed into tangible or intangible matter.230 However,
the transformation test is not without differing interpretations, as the
dissent in LabCorp focused on the purpose of the transformation as
relevant to patentability.213 ' The "assaying" step in the LabCorp claim
could be interpreted as requiring a transformation, but the focus of
232novelty was not that particular transformation. However, the Board
also stated that:
Where the steps define a transformation of physical subject matter
(tangible or intangible) to a different state or thing, as normally
present in chemical, electrical, and mechanical cases, there is no
question that the subject matter is statutory; e.g., "mixing" two
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at *4; Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1393-94 (B.P.A.I. 2005)
(precedential); USPTO, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility (Nov. 22, 2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines101_20051026.pdf
(hereinafter Interim Guidelines).
229. Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1399, 1409.
230. Id. at 1400.
231. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2927 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
232. See id. at 2924.
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elements or compounds is clearly a statutory transformation that
results in a chemical substance or mixture although no apparatus is
claimed to perform the step and although the step could be
performed manually.
233
Even though the claim is not directed at a transformation, one
could argue that transformations may occur. Language differences
between words such as "assaying" and "mixing" may be important in
biotechnology claims, as those words can be used frequently to add
steps that convey the use of physical devices or physical
transformations. These terms will still need to be analyzed as to their
function within the claim. For example, Bilski cited Lundgren for the
proposition that not all action may convey utility: "[i]ncidental
physical limitations, such as data gathering, field of use limitations,
and post-solution activity are not enough to convert an 'abstract idea'
into a statutory 'process'. 234 The analysis may inject some of the
Flook test and require that the physical step be part of the inventive
concept and not an insubstantial activity. Again, this is a similar
concern to that discussed by Justice Breyer for the assaying step in
claim 13.235
The Board discussed the three exclusions to patentability, i.e.,
laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.2 36 They
focused on the abstract idea exclusion and identified relevant issues
for that analysis.237 Transformation was one; another was whether the
claim covered substantially all of the practical applications of a way
the steps were performed (preemption).238 The Board likened
preemption to the analysis in LabCorp where the assaying step could
be performed by any test at all. 239 The Judges also questioned the
helpfulness of the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test to
determine statutory subject matter and thought that it was redundant
with the existing plain language of the statute.240
Ultimately, the Board rejected the claims as nonstatutory subject
matter by stating that the claim was not computer related, that it was
not a process because it was an abstract idea, there was no
233. Ex parte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055, at * 11 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8,
2007) (citing Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1417).
234. Id. at *8 (citing Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1401).
235. See generally Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2926-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
236. Bilski, 2006 WL 4080055, at *7.
237. See id. at *8.
238. See id.
239. See id
240. See id at * 10.
314 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
transformation, and the claim would cover substantially all practical
uses of the idea.24' Judge Barrett commented on what he thought was
the important factor by saying "the transformation of physical subject
matter test is a more objective way to perform the [section] 101
analysis for non-machine-implemented method claims. 242
This decision is interesting as it provides one of the most
extensive discussions of the problems faced by the PTO in struggling
with the issue. Judge Barrett wrote the decision and he has been
involved in many Board decisions on this matter.243 He was clearly
interested in guidance from the Federal Circuit and posed fourteen
questions that he would like to see answered.244 For example, among
other questions, he asked: does a process always require
transformation; is it sufficient that energy be transformed; will the use
of a general purpose machine always make a claim statutory, even
when the machine is old; when will a physical step convert the claim
into statutory subject matter; is State Street Bank limited to
transformation of data by a machine; and what is the definition of
"useful, concrete, and tangible"? 245 The issue to be decided on appeal
will relate to the requirement for a physical transformation or physical
device in the claims versus the application of the "useful, concrete,
and tangible result" test without a machine.246 Since this test was
questioned by Justice Breyer in his LabCorp dissent, it will be useful
to see how the Federal Circuit addresses this issue again after In re
Nutiten. Clarification of the questions will be important for future
guidance.
B. In re Nuiten
241
In re Nuijten was decided by the Federal Circuit and was one of
two recent opinions to discuss section 101. Nuijten's application
contained claims to a process for encoding a signal (1-10), an
arrangement for embedding supplemental data in a signal using an
encoding means (1 1-13), a signal (14, 22-24), and a storage medium
having a signal with embedded supplementary data (15). 248 All
claims but number 14 were allowed, which was the subject of the
241. Seeid. at*11-12.
242. Id. at *30.
243. See id. at * 1.
244. See id. at * 13-15.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
248. See id. at 1351.
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appeal. 249 The signal was an audio or video watermark that was
embedded to protect against unauthorized copying.
250
The examiner rejected the claims as an abstract idea with no
physical embodiment. 251 The applicants rebutted that statement and
replied that "a signal is not abstract, but '[s]aid signal comprises
energy, is detectable, and measurable [and] is as physical and tangible
as a table or a baseball' and is not naturally occurring."25 2The Board
held that the claims were nonstatutory because they represented an
abstract idea which was not in one of the four statutory categories. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the
254
section 101 issue de novo in In re Nuijten. The holding by the
majority framed the issue as an inquiry into whether the appealed
claims fit into one of the four categories of statutory subject matter,
namely process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.255
The Court construed the claims first, which can often determine
the end result. The construction focused on the physical nature of the
signal.256 The Court determined that the signal was itself physical, but
it needed some other physical structure for practical use. 257 The
Judges stated: "[h]owever, while the claims are limited so as to
require some physical carrier of information, they do not in any way
specify what carrier element is to be used. The only limitations in
claim 14 address the signal's informational content., 258 The Court
249. See id.
250. See id at 1348-49.
251. See Ex parte Nuijten, Appeal No. 2003-0853, 2006 WL 3939192, at *1-2
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2006).
252. See id. at *2 (alterations in original).
253. Seeid. at*3.
254. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
255. See id at 1353.
256. The Court stated:
The claim construction dispute between Nuijten and the PTO turns on a
somewhat esoteric and metaphysical point, namely: are the claims at issue
limited to covering only physical instances of signals, or do they also cover
intangible, immaterial strings of abstract numbers? The PTO suggests that "claim
14 can be read to claim a signal that is merely data" - that is, merely numerical
information without any physical embodiment. Nuijten disagrees, arguing that "a
signal must have sufficient physical substance to be discerned and recognized by
a recipient." That is, a signal can be sensed and received by some physical
apparatus, if not directly by a person.
Id. at 1353.
257. Seeid. at 1353.
258. Id.
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stated that since there was no explicit structure for the signal, any
tangible means would be covered by the claim.259
Nuijten and the PTO had agreed that the signal was physical, but
transitory in nature.260 The Court determined that transitory physical
signals were not statutory subject matter because they did not fit
within one of the four statutory subject classes: process, composition,
machine or article of manufacture. 26' For example, the signal of claim
14 did not require an action, so it was not a process; it was not a
concrete thing having parts, so it was not a machine; and it was not a
chemical union, a mechanical mixture, gas, fluid, powder or solid, so
it was not a composition of matter.262 However, the Court had the
most difficulty determining that a signal was not an article of
263manufacture. A signal is manufactured by man, but being made by
man is not the only criteria for statutory subject matter.2 4 The
definitions the Court found for "manufacture" related to tangible
commodities and concluded that even though a signal was man-made,
physical and causes tangible effects, it was fleeting and devoid of
permanence. 265 So, they held that the signals standing alone were not
"manufacture(s)" as contemplated by section 101.266
The dissent agreed with the majority that the signal was physical,
267but, unlike the majority, found that it was statutory subject matter.
Judge Linn stated that the policy favoring what was statutory should
be read broadly so as to accommodate new technologies.268 He
refuted the idea that a signal was not patentable because it was
transitory or lacked permanence, by referring to patents that claimed
chemical intermediaries. He also referred to Application of Hruby,26 9
where a patent was awarded for a transient water fountain display.
Judge Linn also referred to the test in Alappat, which suggests that an
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 1353-54. The court first distinguished its comments in State Street Bank
which suggested that an invention need not be placed into one of the above classes. It clarified
that a claimed invention must fall into a class, only that it was not critical that the specific class
need to be determined. It stated that the question here was whether the claims fell into any class,
not just which one.
262. Id. at 1355-57.
263. See id. at 1356.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 1356.
266. Id. at 1357.
267. See id. at 1358 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
268. See id
269. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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invention is patentable if it produces a useful, concrete, and tangible
result, and he noted that it does not require that the claimed subject
matter be a tangible thing.27°
Judge Linn concluded with the observation that claims should be
given wide scope in the section 101 analysis. 27' His conclusion was
supported by Chakrabarty, but subject to the three exceptions (law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea).272 Judge Linn discussed
how the word "new" was used in the statute and related it to the
natural phenomenon exception.273 He found that the basis for
excluding scientific principles from statutory subject matter, as
described in Flook, was "that a scientific principle ... reveals a
relationship that has always existed., 274 Additionally, reference to
Benson was also useful as it showed that one could not attempt to
,'monopolize a timeless mathematical relationship among integers,
even if the particular representations of the integers may have been
new to computer science.,, 275 This observation would apply to the
biological arts as set out in the LabCorp discussion.
Judge Linn's discussion of the "useful" requirement of the
statute also applied across different technologies.276 An abstract idea
would be too attenuated to be useful, as discussed in Funk Bros where
the Supreme Court distinguished an unpatentable phenomenon of
nature from its application.277 He also argued that the signal is
physical because, just like smoke signals which convey data, the
signal must be detectable to successfully signal anything.278 In fact, he
points to O'Reilly v. Morse279 and The Telephone Cases280 for the
patentability of signals in which the use of telegraphy to convey
Morse code was held to be patentable.28'
The Nuijten decision is interesting as it is the first Federal Circuit
decision to discuss statutory subject matter after the LabCorp
270. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1359 n.1 (Linn, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-
part).
271. Id. at 1362.
272. Id.
273. See id at 1363-64.
274. Id. at 1364 (alteration in original).
275. Id.
276. See id. at 1365-67.
277. Seeid. at 1365.
278. Id. at 1368.
279. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 124 (1853).
280. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1,572-73 (1888).
281. SeelnreNuyten, 500 F.3dat 1368-69.
318 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
dismissal. It is also illuminating that the majority accepted that the
signals would be patentable if stored on a common physical device.
This would imply that the Federal Circuit could accept that a
biological claim, such as claim 13 in LabCorp, would be statutory if it
included a routine step or physical device from the prior art, which
may be contrary to Flook.
The discussion of transformation is also useful as it shows that
there are limits on what the Federal Circuit will accept as conveying
subject matter utility. In the biological context, that may translate into
a requirement for a higher threshold for what would be a
transformation. For example, more actual physical steps in lieu of one
simple statement for "assaying" may be required to ensure that a
transformation is clearly part of the claim. Also, would a non-invasive
imaging system cause a transformation if it could assay or detect a
result without causing any physical change? It is also useful to see
how the Federal Circuit treats the "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" test. The dissent states that this test does not require that there
be a tangible "thing", but a tangible "result.,
282
C. In re Comiskey
283
This decision was released the same day as In re Nuijten and
discussed section 101 in a different technical context. "Comiskey's
patent application ... claim[ed] a method and system for mandatory
arbitration involving legal documents, such as wills or contracts." 284
According to the application, the claimed "program ... requires
resolution by binding arbitration of any challenge or complaint
concerning any unilateral document... [or] contractual document." 285
The Court analyzed the claim and determined that there were no
physical devices or computers that were required to perform the
process of the independent claims.28 6 Also, there was no physical
transformation of anything in the claim. 287 They interpreted the claim
as mere mental processes or steps and thus unpatentable.2 88
282. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 132-33.
283. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
284. Id. at 1368.
285. Id. (alterations in original).
286. Id. at 1369.
287. Id. at 1379.
288. See id. at 1378-80.
In other words, the patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems
that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a field of endeavor
that both the framers and Congress intended to be beyond the reach of patentable
2008] LAWS OF NATURE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 319
However, the Court chose to single out four dependent claims
that recited establishing access through the Internet, software
applications, telephone, and cable, among other devices. 289 They
stated that an unpatentable mental process may be combined with a
machine to render it patentable. 290 They concluded that these claims
were statutory subject matter because "[w]hile the mere use of the
machine to collect data necessary for application of the mental
process may not make the claim patentable subject matter, these
claims in combining the use of machines with a mental process, claim
patentable subject matter., 291
This is an interesting analysis as applied to claim 13 of LabCorp
where the assaying step could be classified as data gathering, and the
correlating step could be classified as mental steps. Following this
logic, the LabCorp claims would not be patentable, but could be if
limited to art recognized physical structure.
This decision has similar issues to Nuiten, but different subject
matter. It also shows that the Federal Circuit has paid attention to the
concerns of the Supreme Court by raising the rejection sua sponte at
the appeal stage. Again, it is interesting that standard physical devices
can provide patentability under section 101. However, the distinction
drawn between acceptable physical limitations and incidental usage
was whether the physical machine was necessary for, or tied to the
operation of the method.292 The Court also reiterated statements that
processes for human thinking, standing alone, were not patentable.
293
D. Ex parte Jakobsson 
2 94
Jakobsson's claims were directed to a method, apparatus, and
machine readable medium for generating one or more output values
of a one-way chain which are used in processor based cryptographic
applications such as encryption, decryption, digital signatures,
subject matter. Thus, it is established that the application of human intelligence to
the solution of practical problems is not in and of itself patentable.
Id. at 1378-79.
289. Id. at 1379.
290. Id. (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178-79, 192-93 (1981); AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
291. Id. at 1380 (citations omitted).
292. See id. at 1379-80.
293. Id. at 1377.
294. Ex parte Jakobsson, Appeal No. 2006-2107, 2007 WL 1371371 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 16,
2007).
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message authentication, user and device authentication, micro-
payments, etc. 295 The examiner rejected claims 1 and 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject matter.296
The Board, citing Supreme Court precedent, stated that it was
not always easy to determine whether process claims were statutory
subject matter, but that a method may qualify if it was tied to a
particular apparatus or changed materials to a different state or
thing.297 The Board referred to Federal Circuit decisions to state that
physical transformation, while not a mandatory requirement, is an
example of statutory subject matter.298 The Board also cited other
Federal Circuit decisions that indicate that the data transformation
step may satisfy this requirement. 299 These decisions held that an
electronic heart measurement and the transformation of data into
share price both constituted statutory subject matter. The Board
stated: "Thus, while Diehr involved the transformation of a tangible
object - curing synthetic rubber - Federal Circuit also regards the
transformation of intangible subject matter to similarly be eligible, so
long as data or signals represent some real world activity."
300
The Board summed up its view of case law relating to the
patentability of computer signals:
Accordingly, our understanding of the precedents at present is:
Any computer program claimed as a machine implementing the
program (Alappat, State Street) or as a method of a machine
implementing the program (AT&T), is patentable if it transforms
data and achieves a useful, concrete and tangible result (State
Street, AT&7). Exceptions occur when the invention in actuality
pre-empts an abstract idea, as in a mathematical algorithm
(Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72). 301
Ultimately, the Board determined that the process claims were
not statutory subject matter because they were not limited to any
particular technology, apparatus, machinery or end use and they were
an attempt to pre-empt all substantial applications of the claimed
295. Id. at *2.
296. Id. at*l.
297. Id. at *6 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978)).
298. Id. at *7 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comme'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
299. Id. See also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Arrhythmia
Research Tech. Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
300. Jakobsson, 2007 WL 1371371 at *7.
301. Id. at*10.
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algorithm which would be a patent on the algorithm itself.30 2 The
Board made the same conclusion about claims 20 and 21 even though
they were written as a machine and medium claims.30 3 Nuijten and
Comiskey state that these types of claims are patentable, but
Jakobsson states that the non-machine part of the claim must still
produce a useful, concrete and tangible result.
304
E. Ex parte Gutta
30 5
This decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
arose as a new ground of rejection at the Board level and therefore is
not appealable to the Federal Circuit. The main claim states:
1. A method for use in a recommender for evaluating the closeness
of two items, each of said items characterized by at least one
symbolic feature, said method comprising the steps of:
[(a)] computing a distance between corresponding symbolic
feature values of said two items based on an overall similarity
of classification of all instances for each possible value of said
symbolic feature values; and
[(b)] aggregating the distances between each of said symbolic
feature values to determine the closeness of said two items.
30 6
The Board entered the new rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as
they said that the claim was an attempt to cover an abstract idea.30 7
They also stated that it is generally difficult to determine whether a
process is an abstract idea since some minor physical steps, such as
data gathering or post-solution activity, can be included in the claim
to provide the appearance of patentability.
30 8
It was determined that "computing" and "aggregating" in
independent claims 1 and 10 were mathematical functions and, as
such, the methods were disembodied concepts. 309 Mathematical
algorithms are nonstatutory subject matter as they represent an
attempt to patent the algorithm itself.310 The Board analyzed the claim
302. Seeid. at*I1-12,§7.
303. See id. at *12-13, § 9-10.
304. See id. at *9-11.
305. Exparte Gutta, Appeal No. 2007-1246, 2007 WL 1766997 (B.P.A.I. June 11, 2007).
306. Id. at*1.
307. Id. at *34.
308. Id. at *3.
309. Id. at *34.
310. Id. at *3. See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972); In re Castelet,
562 F.2d 1236, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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to determine if, even assuming that the claims were not solely
directed to algorithms, the claim was directed to a practical
application of an abstract idea. They cited State Street Bank to suggest
that the production of a useful, concrete and tangible result equates to
a practical application of an abstract idea.311 However, the Board
found no physical matter being transformed, no numerical values
being manipulated, and that the methods failed to produce a useful,
concrete, and tangible result. 312 Consequently, the Board rejected the
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to nonstatutory subject
matter.
This decision is another recent example of non-machine
implemented claims that are being rejected on new grounds at the
Board. Claim 1 was a non-machine implemented algorithm, but
claims 19 and 23 required the use of general purpose machines. The
Board rejected the non-machine implemented claims for the lack of
data transformation. However, it is interesting to note that they also
rejected the claims that required the general purpose machine because
they did not produce a useful, concrete, or tangible result.
313
F. Exparte Glenner
314
Ex parte Glenner also raised the issue of section 101 as a new
ground of rejection.315 It was decided about nine months after
Bilski.3 16 Bilski and Lundgren fleshed out the basic issues, but
Glenner applied the analysis that had developed over the intervening
period. The Board discussed the definition of a process, how
transformation affected patentability, the three exceptions and the
"useful, concrete and tangible result" test. 317 The decision reads more
like the application of well settled law than the Bilski opinion.
However, Glenner's claims did not just recite a non-machine
implemented algorithm.318 Claims 1 and 23 generally relate to
311. See Gutta, 2007 WL 1766997 at *4 (citing . State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
312. Id. at *4.
313. Id. at *4-5.
314. Ex parte Glenner, Appeal No. 2007-1089, 2007 WL 1874818 (B.P.A.I. June 28,
2007).
315. Jd. at*1.
316. Compare Glenner, 2007 WL 1874818, decided on June 28, 2007, with Ex parte
Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006) decided on March 8,
2006.
317. See Glenner, 2007 WL 1874818, at *11-20.
318. See generally id. at * 1.
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browsing media, and specifically to "perform[ing] visual selection
and annotation of media objects using intrinsic and extrinsic
metadata.
31 9
The Court found claim 23 unpatentable:
Appellants' method claim 23 differs from traditional process
claims in several respects. For example, the claim does not recite
any particular way of implementing the steps, nor does it require
any machine or apparatus to perform the steps. In addition, the
method claim does not recite any electrical, chemical, or
mechanical acts or results, which are typical in traditional process
claims. Finally, the claim does not call for any physical
transformation of an article to a different state or thing. While
claim 23 does perform a transformation of data by "combining a
subset of the media objects to generate a new media object," it
does not require any machine or apparatus to perform the steps.
The question of whether any of these distinctions takes claim 23
outside the realm of patent-eligible subject matter has never been
squarely addressed by the Federal Circuit. Appellants' claims are
not the type of method that the Supreme Court or Federal Circuit
has ever found patentable under section 101. 320
The Board reached back to old Supreme Court precedent like
Benson and Diehr, but also discussed pre-State Street Bank and AT&T
Federal Circuit decisions and even cited to the LabCorp dissent as
support for requiring machines to be necessary and recited in the
claims.321 However, the primary focus of the opinion was on In re
319. Id. Specifically, they claim:
1. A media generation system comprising:
a component that receives a plurality of media objects;
a component that annotates the plurality of media objects with at least a subset of
metadata;
a component that generates at least one new media object via combining a subset
of the media objects based at least in part upon the metadata associated therewith;
and
a component that embeds a first media object into a second media object.
23. A method of editing media to generate new media comprising:
receiving a plurality of media objects, at least a portion of which are annotated
with metadata;
identifying the metadata;
combining a subset of the media objects to generate a new media object, the
combining being based at least in part upon the identified metadata; and
embedding a first media object into a second media object.
Id.
320. Id. at *11.
321. Seeid. at *10-20.
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Schrader322 where the Board rejected the idea that a process claim
could be patentable even if it did not transform an article or thing.323
The Board distinguished State Street Bank, AT&T, Arrhythmia and
Alappatt by stating that these decisions required data transformation
and that there was no transformation in these claims. 4 This latest
opinion by the Board stands for the premise that a process claim will
not be patentable, even though it is useful, if it does not transform an
article or thing, such as by a machine.325
G. Classen v. Biogen
326
Classen raises the issue of statutory subject matter in a biological
context similar to the issues that were dismissed in the LabCorp
Supreme Court appeal. The section 101 issues have been vetted by the
parties throughout the litigation and that should obviate the
procedural problem encountered in LabCorp.
327
Classen Immunotherapies "developed and patented methods for
evaluating and improving the safety of immunization schedules."
328
The company holds U.S. Patent Nos. 6,420,139, 6,638,739,
5,728,385, and 5,723,283 directed to these inventions.329 Classen
alleged that a large group of defendants infringed the patents by
"examining the correlation between vaccination schedules and the
risk of developing chronic immune mediated disorders; and... [then]
by using the results of that study to develop [new] vaccination
protocols., 330 The District Court for the District of Maryland,
Northern Division dismissed the infringement claims and Classen
requested reconsideration. 33' One of the issues was whether the claims
at issue were directed to statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101.332 A representative claim of U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 is:
322. See id at *14-16; In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
323. See Glenner, 2007 WL 1874818, at *14 & n.7. Footnote 7 discussed AT&T which
called Schrader "unhelpful" because it did not reach the question whether a "useful, concrete,
and tangible" result occurred.
324. Seeid. at*13-14.
325. See id. at *15.
326. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, et al., Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607
(D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006).
327. See id
328. Classen, Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607, slip op. at 2.
329. Id.
330. id.
331. Id. at 2-3.
332. Seeid. at 9-12.
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1. A method of determining whether an immunization schedule
affects the incidence or severity of a chronic immune-mediated
disorder in a treatment group of mammals, relative to a control
group of mammals, which comprises immunizing mammals in the
treatment group of mammals with one or more doses of one or
more immunogens, according to said immunization schedule, and
comparing the incidence, prevalence, frequency or severity of said
chronic immune-mediated disorder or the level of a marker of such
a disorder, in the treatment group, with that in the control group.
333
The defendant argued that the claim was "unpatentable because
[it] involve[d] 'thinking about' whether a vaccination schedule
reduce[d] the incidence of chronic disease and [was]... an abstract
mental process about a natural phenomenon." 334 The Court looked at
the '283 patent claim above, stated that the correlation was a natural
phenomenon, and determined that the question was "whether the ...
patents simply describe[d] the correlation., 335 The Court went on to
state that the '283 claim described a general inquiry about the
correlation and was "indistinguishable from the idea itself. 3 36 The
patents did not describe a particular vaccine or schedule and were
little more than an inquiry into the extent of the correlation. 337 With
respect to the '139 and '739 patents, the Court added "[a]s it would
appear that the 139 and 739 patents are an indirect attempt to patent
the idea that there is a relationship between vaccine schedules and
chronic immune mediated disorders, the Court finds they are an
attempt to patent an unpatentable natural phenomenon.,
338
The Court did not discuss whether the claimed process
transformed an article into a different state or thing, which may have
led to a conclusion of patentable subject matter under prior case
333. U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283 col.51 11.50-60 (filed May 31, 1995). The defendants raised
the defense set out in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). See generally Corrected Brief for Defendant-
Appellee Biogen IDEC , Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, et al., Nos. 2006-
1634, -1649 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2007), 2007 WL 869894 [hereinafter Biogen Brief]; Corrected
Brief for Defendant-Appellee Glaxosmithkline, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
et al., Nos. 2006-1634, -1649 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2007), 2007 WL 869893 [hereinafter GSK
Brief].
334. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, et al., Civ. No. WDQ-04-2607, slip
op. at 10-11 (D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006).
335. Id. at 1l.
336. Id
337. Id. at 12.
338. Id.
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law. 339 However, that issue was more fully developed in the Briefs on
appeal to the Federal Circuit.
340
Classen argued to the Federal Circuit that the claims were not
invalid for containing a mental step or scientific truth and that the
Supreme Court interpreted the four statutory classes in section 101 to
include anything made by man. 341 Next, Classen stated that the
claimed method "when evaluated as a whole results in a tangible
result: [which is] the selection of a lower risk schedule and the
resultant vaccination of children in accord with that schedule. 342
Classen stated that the claims do not pertain to "thinking about" a
schedule, instead they related to choosing an immunization
schedule.34 3
Claim 1 of the '283 patent suggests that the active step of
"immunizing" requires a transformation in a mammal because an
immunogen must be delivered into the body of a mammal and the
immune system typically responds to transform the mammal in some
way. However, it appears that Classen interpreted the claims more
broadly to require only a comparison between immunization
schedules, and not the physically active immunization step.34 Classen
was effectively removing the transformation step by stating that
comparing results between previous studies and then designing an
immunization schedule was infringement. This position puts their
statutory subject matter argument on more tentative ground given the
development of the case law and the dissent in LabCorp.
Defendant Merck argued in their Reply brief that the Classen
claims do not require physical steps even though they are limited to
immunizing.345 They asserted that one can infringe the Classen claims
by reading the results of a previous vaccination study and thinking
339. See generally id. at 9-12.
340. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 10-13, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen
IDEC, et al., Nos. 2006-1634, -1649 (Apr. 10, 2007), 2007 WL 1571347 [hereinafter Classen
Reply Brief]; GSK Brief, supra note 333, at 26; Brief for Defendant-Cross Appellant Merck &
Co. at 39, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, et al., Nos. 2006-1634, -1649 (Jan.
16, 2007), 2007 WL 460138 [hereinafter Merck Brief].
341. Corrected Brief for Appellant Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. at 35, Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, et al., Nos. 2006-1634, -1649 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2006),
2006 WL 3846638 [hereinafter Classen Brief].
342. Id. at 36.
343. Id.
344. See generally Classen Brief, supra note 341, at 6-7, 12, 40-41; Merck Brief, supra
note 340, at 12.
345. See Merck Brief, supra note 340, at 1-2.
2008] LAWS OF NATURE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 327
about the application of those results. 346 They claimed that the only
difference between the prior art and the Classen invention is the
thought process. 347 Simply adding immunization to the claim is not
enough to make it patentable under 101, citing Flook.34 8
Clearly, Merck aims to show that the issues here are the same as
the issues that appeared to be unpatentable in LabCorp as outlined by
Justice Breyer. The Supreme Court should agree that simply thinking
about an immunization schedule is non-statutory and that some
physical steps will be required. Comiskey supports this view by
requiring some physical structure in a claim.
Classen also argued in their reply brief that the court should
determine whether the applicant is seeking to patent a formula in the
abstract and not simply ask whether an article is transformed or
reduced because that test is only one example of a patentable
process.349 They cited Diehr for this proposition, but the claims in
Diehr were more active process steps which involved molding
rubber.350 The software component was one step in the overall process
of molding rubber, whereas in Classen there do not seem to be any
physical steps that are similar. The above exemplary claim from '283
is not limited to risk assessment and vaccination. As Classen appears
to interpret it, the claim encompasses simply picking a schedule.
However, this is similar to an algorithm, which can be unpatentable as
an abstract idea or mental steps. Also, Classen argued that the laws of
nature must be classic algorithms, like E=mc2 , and vaccination
schedules were not such a mathematical formulation. 351 However, Ex
parte Jakobsson stated that claims do not need to recite a specific
algorithm to be unpatentable. 3
52
In looking at the algorithm and signals decisions above, in
relation to Classen v. Biogen, one can see that once the Court finds
that the claim is directed to an algorithm, it looks for a transformation
or a practical application on a machine.353 The same is true for the
346. See id. at 2.
347. Id. at 14-15.
348. See generally id. at 36 (citing Parker v. Flock 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
349. See Classen Reply Brief, supra note 340, at 1I.
350. Id. See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981).
351. Classen Brief, supra note 34 1, at 37.
352. Exparte Jakobsson, Appeal No. 2006-2107, 2007 WL 1371371, at *12 (B.P.A.I. Apr.
16, 2007).
353. Benson did not hold that a machine was necessary to convey patentable subject matter
to an algorithm or that a claim would have to comply with all of their prior precedents. See
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
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LabCorp dissent.354 Also, the implication at the Supreme Court is that
a useful, concrete and tangible result may not suffice to classify a
claim as statutory subject matter. Classen can be said to fail the
transformation analysis, given their claim interpretation. Again, using
the Classen interpretation, the claims would cover the review of
preexisting data (mental steps or thinking) of vaccination schedules
and it is unlikely that this analysis would be classified as providing a
useful, concrete and tangible result.
From these post-LabCorp decisions, we can derive the
following:
" The Interim Guideline approach is a reasonable analysis,
including the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test.355
" Being physical is not enough. The matter in the claim may need
to meet other thresholds such as being tangible, substantial, and
356permanent, to fit into a statutory category.
" Claims may be patentable if tied to a general purpose machine.
Data gathering is not a step that will convey patentability
without some key link to the process. Patentability will be more
difficult as one moves away from any physical structure. Human
thinking, without something more, will not be patentable.
357
" Claims do not need to recite a particular algorithm to be
unpatentable. The claimed subject matter will still need to satisfy
the useful, concrete, and tangible result test.358
* Simply reciting storage medium for algorithm will not
necessarily convey patentability as the claims must still satisfy
the useful, concrete, and tangible result test.
359
354. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
355. Exparte Bilski, Appeal No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006).
356. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
357. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
358. Ex parte Jakobsson, Appeal No. 2006-2107, 2007 WL 1371371 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 16,
2007).
359. Exparte Gutta, Appeal No. 2007-1246, 2007 WL 1766997 (B.P.A.I. June 11, 2007).
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9 Some questions arise regarding the vitality of the useful,
concrete, and tangible result test and it is unclear how to define
those terms.
360
V. TESTS FOR STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER
This article addresses the scope of patentability under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. The development of what defines a patent began during the
transition between a system where patents were granted based on
privilege, to a system where patents are granted based on merit.
During that time, it became evident that patents should be awarded to
those who had an invention that was new and properly described. The
requirements for novelty and non-obviousness are codified in 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, while the description requirements are
codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112. Section 101 defines what types of subject
matter may be patented if one satisfies all other criteria.
To be patentable, § 101 requires that the potential invention fit
into one of the four defined classes of proper subject matter as the
first part of any test. They include: a process, machine, article of
manufacture or composition of matter.361 In most areas, it may be a
relatively easy task to assign an invention to one of these classes, but
in other technical areas it is difficult to determine whether an
invention fits into one of the statutory categories.362 The analysis has
been likened to the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law,
which recognizes that the expression of an idea may be protected by
copyright, but that the idea itself cannot be copyrighted.363 However,
over time, case law has provided us with some tests which have been
recently interpreted by various judicial forums from the Patent Office
to the Supreme Court. Tests will be discussed with reference to
biological and diagnostic claims since this is the focus of the present
article.
The policies underlying future tests for patentable subject matter
in the biological context can be seen in the dissent by Justice Breyer
in LabCorp, which represents the ideas of at least three members of
the Court. 364 The general concerns lie in the tension between
360. Ex parte Glenner, Appeal No. 2007-1089, 2007 WL 1874818 (B.P.A.I. June 28,
2007).
361. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
362. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363. See Public Patent Found. Brief, supra note 151, at 12-13.
364. See Lab. Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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encouraging research and development versus diminished incentives
when the system is overprotective. 365 More specifically, the dissent
did not want to give a monopoly on the basis of a scientific factor that
would foreclose other beneficial experimentation.36 6 Justice Breyer
also did not want to stop people from testing, publishing scientific
work, thinking about scientific relationships, or sharing scientific
information.36 7 The dissent was interested in a test that would provide
the proper framework to encourage, but not impede research.36 8
Anyone drafting claims to biological subject matter will need to
address the policies taken from the above case law during prosecution
or litigation. 369 For example, after assigning the invention to one of
the four statutory classes, a drafter will need to answer several
questions: was there anything physical or tangible in the claim or did
it involve an exception to patentability, such as a mental step, abstract
idea, or a law of nature? Was there a tangible physical or chemical
transformation? Was the process for transforming an article the focus
of, or tied to the claim or was transformation incidental? Was there a
preemption of all possible uses for a method claim? These are
important issues, and clearly the tangible, physical element is a
central theme that can change a claim from mere abstraction and
unpatentable to an application and patentable.
The dissent in LabCorp criticizes some of the existing tests set
forth in case law, including the "useful, concrete, and tangible result"
test.370 At least one Board decision discussed above has also
questioned the test. However, the Federal circuit still determines
whether the subject matter is tangible.37 1
Given this recent jurisprudence, claim limitations should be
added to ensure that section 101 will be satisfied when reviewed by
the PTO or a court. Practitioners can include tangible, physical
devices or physical, chemical, or perhaps even data transformations.
The physical devices or transformations should relate to the inventive
aspect of the device to avoid the issues raised in Flook and to ensure
that the inventive aspect is considered as part of the whole invention
as in Diehr. Obviously, inserting additional claim limitations can
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 2927-28.
370. See id. at 2928.
371. See In re Nuijten, 400 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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create concerns for infringement and biological or diagnostic claims
can present special issues due to the possibility that the claim will be
performed by more than one entity. For example, it is typical that
different entities will collect, process or analyze the biological
sample. Therefore, a practitioner will need to consider which steps
will satisfy section 101 while providing reasonable coverage for the
invention. Only those steps that will be associated with one entity
should be included in the claim.
Even though a tangible, physical element may be claimed in a
process, that element must not claim all substantial uses as it would
essentially negate the limiting nature of the element to render it
useless. The LabCorp dissent found that claim 13 violated that
prohibition irrespective of the physical transformation step. One
important question is how this issue may apply to single or multiple
claims. If the drafter simply divides up all the known ways to perform
the transformation into multiple claims, will all substantial uses be
analyzed for each claim, or for the entirety of the patent? It may be
logical to apply the analysis to all claims as a whole.
The PTO has proposed its own internal test for what is
patentable in their "Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility" (the
"Guidelines").372 The Guidelines were published on November 22,
2005, so they have not incorporated more recent developments in the
law.373 However, they covered much of the same territory. For
example, they require that the examiner first look at the claim as a
whole and see what category the claim recites (process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter).374 The next step is to check
for any of the three exceptions to patentability (abstract idea, law of
nature, or mental steps).375 Then, the Guidelines ask if there is a
practical application, such as a physically transformation or a useful,
concrete, and tangible result.376 Finally, the Guidelines require that the
examiner determine if the claims cover all substantial uses of the
exception to patentability. 377 These Guidelines are the internal rules of
the patent office and do not have the force of law, but they are derived
from the relevant decisions discussed above. One difference to note is
372. See Interim Guidelines, supra note 228.
373. See id.
374. Id. § IV (B).
375. Id. § IV (c).
376. Id. § IV (C)(2).
377. Id. § IV (C)(2)(b)(3).
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the LabCorp's dissent where the "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" was questioned in light of prior Supreme Court precedent.
378
VI. PRACTICAL EFFECTS
As several of the LabCorp Amicus briefs indicated, the potential
effect on patents could be significant as there are many issued claims
that follow similar formats. Typical claims in diagnostic settings
include the following example language:
A method for diagnosing disease X, comprising the steps of: a)
determining a level of Y and b) comparing the level of Y
determined in step a) with a normal level of Y from control
subjects, wherein (i) normal level or lower than normal levels of Y
indicates absence of disease X; and (ii) higher than normal level of
Y indicates the presence of disease X.
A method for diagnosing increased risk of disease X in a human
subject, comprising the steps of: investigating the presence of a
target gene, wherein said target gene encodes a polypeptide
comprising the sequence of SEQ ID NO: 1; and diagnosing
increased risk of disease X when the presence of the target gene is
not detected.
The above method claims arguably do not contain anything
tangible or a physical transformation and can be open to challenge
under current case law. However, given some comments in the
LabCorp briefs, there may be limits that could be added in the sample
collection or sample preparation steps to create a physical
transformation. Some example limitations in these, and other
diagnostic claims include: mixing; contacting, inoculating,
vaccinating, changing the charge, attaching a group, detecting a
physical change, chemically altering, extracting compound x and
analyzing the level in serum, contacting a body fluid with a device for
assaying compound x, mixing a body sample with a reagent designed
to determine the level of x, mixing a fluid body sample in a device
that assays the level of x; contacting a body sample with an
instrument that can assay the level of x.
Additionally, the claim could be limited with the use of a
specific physical device to perform the claimed process, such as
"detecting with an instrument capable of. . . ." Additionally, the
claim could be cast as a physical structure, such as a computer
378. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2928
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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medium. For example, "assaying for the level of compound x, storing
the level in a data processing storage medium, calculating the level of
x, correlating the level of x with an indication of disease y, or
calculating the level of x and storing the results a computer storage
medium, inputting values indicative of the level of x, storing them,
correlating the levels to a disease state .... ." These limitations are
simple examples and there are many more. They may be added to
claims to provide utility under section 101, but only in accordance
with the precedents above.
Ultimately, the drafter must determine what limitations need to
be added to any process claim to provide a tangible, physical
transformation or structure and how to avoid claiming all substantial
uses of the transformation. Much of this analysis will be factually
dependant on the invention.
VII.CONCLUSION
Defining statutory subject matter is a hard task for new
technologies, but is also difficult for existing technologies, such as in
diagnostics. Tension exists between protecting invention to encourage
innovation and stifling invention through overprotection. However,
care must be taken that corrective actions do not selectively affect
certain industries over others, as may happen with biological or
diagnostic claims. Good policy reasons support both sides of the
debate, including the policy that the law should encourage new
technologies, as it did for biotechnology and computer programs.
Supreme Court decisions show how difficult it is to make this
determination as the Justices have been closely divided in many of the
decisions discussed above.
The language of section 101 sets out four broad classes for what
is patentable and case law has established various tests to assign a
claimed invention to a class. Those tests are discussed above, but one
key requirement is the injection of something physical (such as a
transformation or a device) into the claimed subject matter. With
something physical, the invention may be patentable as an application
of a law of nature, not unpatentable as claiming only the law itself.
Even though there is a physical element in the claim, two additional
criteria should preferably be met: it should not cover all substantial
uses of the law of nature and any physical limitation should be tied to
the method being claimed.
The courts at all levels are interested in this analysis. The Board
of Appeals is rejecting more claim types based on section 101 and
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seems to be reading prior case law in a limiting fashion. The Federal
Circuit is developing a more conservative view as well but has not
changed its prior decisions expanding the doctrine, as it did in State
Street Bank and other cases. The Supreme Court has shown an
interest in this issue and it is expected that they will seek another
vehicle to test what patentable under section 101. We will need to
wait to see if the LabCorp dissenters will find two other Justices to
join their position.
What may happen when the Supreme Court hears the next case
relating to biology is getting clearer, but open questions remain. Will
they eliminate the useful, concrete, and tangible result test? Will they
seek to push the law back to Flook to require that any law of nature
limitation be non-obvious on its own? Will they strike down existing
tests and posit new tests? The answers to all of these questions may
be unclear, but what is clear is that there will be some opportunities to
revisit the issue in the next year or so and there is a more conservative
mood in determining the scope of intellectual property rights.
Given the case law development and legal environment
surrounding intellectual property, it would appear that this doctrine is
contracting like many other areas of patent law. Non-computer
implemented methods are not patentable and we will probably see a
challenge to those claims as implemented on computers or other
physical devices. Also, there may be a modification or rejection of the
useful, concrete and tangible result test. As to the biological and
diagnostic types of claims, it is unclear in what direction case law will
develop to affect those issued patents. There will still be a
requirement to have a physical element, such as a transformation or a
device, but how far can one go in achieving claims of significant
breadth is yet to be determined. We will probably see a review of the
difference between Flook and Diehr so that the claim elements other
than the law of nature may be the focus of what is patentable.
Whatever the outcome, it would seem that these changes will come
relatively soon given the judicial interest in looking at this issue at all
levels.
